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I. Introduction
Intellectual property has become a pervasive presence in society. Seeping in-
to every nook and cranny of American life, intellectual property casts a protective
haze over everything from the words of an email,' to the shape of a phone, 2 to the se-
quence of genes . In our jurisprudential tradition, these rights do not spring forth
from some notion of a natural or moral entitlement. Rather, the underlying logic is
decidedly utilitarian. From the store of things that are theoretically available to any-
one in society, we remove certain activity and expression, dedicating them to the
province of one or a few in the hope of bringing benefit to society as a whole. These
benefits include such diverse goals as promoting innovation,5 stimulating creativity
in the arts,6 encouraging the production of quality goods,7 and maintaining an ap-
propriately functioning marketplace.
Nevertheless, intellectual property rights increasingly are being pressed into
the service of schemes that have little to do with the advancement of these societal
1 Copyright law covers original expression fixed in a tangible medium of expression,
which would include the humble email (JULIEN HOFMAN, INTRODUCING COPYRIGHT xi, 164
(2009), available at http://www.col.org/resources/publications/Pages/detail.aspx?PID=312;
Ned Snow, A Copyright Conundrum: Protecting Email Privacy, 55 U. KAN. L. REv. 501, 503 (2007)),
as much as the letter and manuscripts of past generations.
2 See Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 678 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
3 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329, 1334
(2011).
4 There are occasional exceptions to the general rule that intellectual property rights
in the United States are grounded in utilitarianism. The United States adheres to several mul-
tinational treaties that refer to moral rights in the context of copyright and performing rights
for singers and actors, including the Berne Convention, the WIPO Copyright Treaty, and the
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Liter-
ary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S.
222; World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc.
No. 105- 17, 2186 U.N.T.S. 121; World Intellectual Property Organization Performances and
Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105- 17, 2186 U.N.T.S. 203.
5 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.; Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 532-536 (1966); Ariad
Pharms. Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc); see also PharmaStem Ther-
apeutics Inc. v. Viacell Inc., 491 F.3d 1363-1364 (Fed. Cir.2007); WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, LAW OF
PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS, 101 n.2 (1890)
6 E-mail from Hal Wegner (Feb. 2, 2009, 8:53 PST) (on file with author); see also Kinetic
Concepts Inc. v. Blue Sky Med. Grp., 554 F.3d 1010 (Fed. Cir.2009).
7 See Frank H. Alpert, An Analysis of Patent Length: Encouraging Innovation by Shorten-
ing Patent Protection, 11 J. MACROMARKETING 42 (1991) (providing examples of brands that have
become synonymous with their class of product), but note that other goals are involved, pri-
marily consumer deception, and in more modern interpretations, protecting investment in
one's good name. See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated
Theory of Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REv. 1455 (2002).
8 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,481-82 (1974).
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goals and much to do with societal waste. As one former regulator noted, the locus of
creative thought, all too often, has shifted from the R&D department to the legal de-
partment.9
What do we, as a society, do when these rights that we have created with
such lofty goals and noble heart are diverted toward less admirable pursuits, that is,
when IP rights become the vehicles for IP wrongs? Under these circumstances, the
legal system must develop a way to respond.
In modern society, intellectual property rights are being used for purposes
such as hiding embarrassing or illegal conduct, avoiding obligations, pressuring oth-
ers into surrendering rights, harassing competitors, and engaging in complex anti-
competitive schemes. This article will describe these and many other types of ques-
tionable behavior that are increasingly appearing in the assertion of both patents and
copyrights.
Such behavior is happening because attributes of the intellectual property
system are allowing intellectual property rights holders to bargain for compensation
far beyond the value of the right. I call this a "magnification" of the rights -although
one colleague has complained that terms such as magnification are far too tepid to
describe the aggressive and unsavory behavior that is taking place. The phenomenon
is playing out in ways that damage innovation, create dysfunction in markets and
waste vast amounts of legal resources. As federal district court judge James Roberts
recently noted in frustration, "[T]he court is well aware that it is being played as a
pawn."1o
The problems go far beyond the massive patent wars in the smartphone in-
dustry that are making headlines. Although the smartphone wars are certainly
wasteful and troubling, they are the tip of the iceberg, an example in which the par-
ties are so big and the stakes so high that the activities are spilling over into the pub-
lic square and attracting attention. Smartphone patent wars, however, are merely a
symptom of what is happening on many levels in the world of intellectual property.
Consider the law firm that purchased copyrights in pornographic movies,
used simple tracking tools to find people who have downloaded the movies, and
then sent letters demanding a licensing fee. Unsurprisingly, many people chose to
9 Dr. Donald Kennedy, Comm'r, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Keynote Address at the
UC Hastings Conference: Faces of Forensics (Mar. 2008).
10 See Jeff John Roberts, Famous judge spikes Apple-Google case, calls patent system "dys-
functional", GIGAOM (un. 8 2012), http://gigaom.com/2012/06/08/famous-judge-spikes-
apple-google-case-calls-patent-system-dysfunctional/ (discussing Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc.,
No. 1:11-CV-08540, 2012 WL 2362630, at *1 (N.D. Ill. E. Div. Jun. 7, 2012)).
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immediately pay $1,000, rather than risk having their name exposed in a lawsuit
about pornographic films."
Or consider the patent holders who are sending demand letters directly to
small companies stating that the companies cannot "use" common office equipment
they have purchased without paying a licensing fee. By targeting consumers, rather
than the office equipment makers themselves, these patent holders are able to ap-
proach people who have little information about patents and little ability or incentive
to do anything but pay.
Or consider patent holders who have refused to identify which patent claims
they were asserting against a target company unless the target signed a broad non-
disclosure agreement, or other patent holders who have purportedly required the
target to sign, not just a nondisclosure agreement, but also a non-disparagement
agreement. Interactions such as these raise a host of concerns, including implications
for freedom of speech, for the notion that patents should provide notice of the territo-
ry claimed by the patent holder, and for the ability of competition authorities to iden-
tify anticompetitive behavior. This article describes these and many other examples
of the troubling behaviors that are spreading throughout intellectual property mar-
kets.
As the marketplace for ideas has developed in strange and uncomfortable
ways, the law must adapt as well. We need a mechanism for restraining inappropri-
ate use of intellectual property and for signaling the difference between the accepta-
ble pursuit of a return from your intellectual property and the inappropriate oppres-
sion of others, using the legal system and societally granted privileges as a weapon.
The law does have a few anemic doctrines to call upon. Within intellectual
property, these include patent misuse, copyright misuse, and inequitable conduct.
The first two are rarely used with any success. The third, after a troubled history, has
been all but laid to rest in the recent patent reform legislation.12 It is no surprise that
1 See Kate Darling, What Drives IP Without IP? A Study of the Online Adult Enter-
tainment Industry 24-25 (February 2013) (working paper), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2198934; see also Malibu Media, LLC v.
John Does 1-10, No: 12CV3623(ODW), 2012 WL 5382304 (C.D. Cal. Jun. 27, 2012) ("[T]he poten-
tial for abuse is very high. The infringed work is a pornographic film. To save himself from
embarrassment, even if he is not the infringer, the subscriber will very likely pay the settle-
ment price. And if the subscriber is a business, it will likely pay the settlement to save itself
from the hassle and cost of complying with discovery-even though one of its customers or
employees is the actual infringer.").
12 35 U.S.C. § 257(c)(1) (2012); Anthony W. Shaw, Inequitable Conduct, Willfulness,
and Inducement under the AIA, LExIsNExIs PATENT LAW COMMUNITY, (available at
http://www.lexisnexis.com/community/patentlaw/blogs/patentlegislationandreform/archi
ve/2012/01/02/inequitable-conduct-willfulness-and-inducement-under-the-aia.aspx) (com-
mentary on the America Invents Act regarding the changes related to inequitable conduct). See
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these approaches provide little assistance. They are seriously flawed doctrines that
lack the robustness necessary for the task at hand.
One could turn to doctrines outside of intellectual property, including laches,
implied contract, sham litigation and antitrust. Antitrust in particular has been used
across time to challenge anticompetitive schemes involving intellectual property.' 3
Some of these doctrines could provide avenues to address particular aspects of the
conduct, particularly if the doctrines were modified to take into account modern in-
tellectual property practices. None of these doctrines, however, has the capacity to
address the full breadth of the problems. When a comprehensive problem exists, the
answer lies in attacking its roots, in addition to trimming the tendrils as they emerge
in various places.
A logical step in the evolution of intellectual property law would be the de-
velopment of a concept of "inappropriate use of intellectual property." This article
will sketch out the contours of what such a doctrine should contain.
Describing the theoretical framework that needs to emerge, to some extent,
harkens back to the emergence of the Court of Chancery in fourteenth and fifteenth
century England and the development of the concept of equity. It is always treacher-
ous to analogize anything to equity, given its lack of a coherent, defining identity.
(As F.W. Maitland noted, equity is that portion of our existing substantive law that
can be marked off from other portions of law only by reference to courts no longer in
existence, which is a poor thing to call a definition.)14 Nor would one necessarily
want to follow an area of law that has been accused, on the one hand, of making pos-
sible "decisions that are flexible, intuitive, and tailored" while on the other hand,
making possible "decisions that are unanalyzed, unexplained and un-thoughtful." 5
Nevertheless, British courts of equity emerged in part because law courts were not
also Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Robin Feldman,
The Role of the Subconscious in Intellectual Property Law, 2 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 1, 14-23
(2010) (reviewing the perils of strict liability attached to a finding of inequitable conduct, in-
creasing abuse of the doctrine, and a lack of clear standards upon which inequitable conduct
has been found); Christian E. Mammen, Controlling the "Plague": Reforming the Doctrine of Ineq-
uitable Conduct, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1331 (2009) (reviewing excessive allegation of inequita-
ble conduct and suggesting: (1) adoption of the PTO's 1992 definition of materiality, (2) stand-
ardization of the definition of "intent," (3) codification of "balancing" materiality and intent,
and (4) limiting remedy to invalidation of the claims found to have been approved through
inequitable conduct).
13 See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2001); United States
v. Apple, Inc., No. 12-CV-2826 (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 11, 2012).
14 F.W. MATTLAND, THE ORIGIN OF EQuITY IN EQUITY: A COURSE OF LECTURES, 1 (Cam-
bridge 1936).
15 DAN R. DOBBS, 1 DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES - EQurry - RESTTrUiON 92 (West
2d ed. 1973).
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allowed to see the full view of what was transpiring between the parties and because
the system lacked sufficient remedial mechanisms.'6 Modern problems in intellectual
property echo both of these.
In examining the boundaries of what is and is not appropriate in the use of
intellectual property, one ought to be inspired by the recent decision of renowned ju-
rist Richard Posner, who was presiding over a massive intellectual property battle
between Apple and Google. In describing his ruling from the bench, Judge Posner
called arguments on one side "silly" and arguments on the other side "ridiculous."
Ultimately, he dismissed the case entirely on the grounds that neither party would be
able to demonstrate true harm." There is no reason to mince words in this area. Intel-
lectual property owners are using legal entitlements and the legal system in ways in
which the true harm is suffered by the courts and society as a whole. We can do bet-
ter, and this article is intended to offer a step in that direction.
Part I of the Article describes the phenomenon of magnification, and Part II
details examples of troubling schemes in modem intellectual property markets.
Many of these schemes have not been described previously in academic literature,
and some have not been described anywhere. Part III explains current legal tools,
demonstrating their inadequacies. Part IV discusses the initial contours of the doc-
trine of inappropriate use of intellectual property and explores examples of how it
could be applied. To support development of that doctrine, as well as to explore po-
tential structural changes in the intellectual property system, Part V turns to the
broad investigatory powers of the Federal Trade Commission under Section 6(b).
This section describes why the Commission should initiate such an investigation and
suggests ways in which such an investigation might be structured.
Before moving further, I do wish to note two caveats. First, although exam-
ples of inappropriate use of intellectual property are more prevalent in certain areas
of intellectual property, the doctrine is intended to cover all types of IP--copyright,
patent, trademark and trade secret. Although scholarship tends to treat trademark
and trade secret as poor stepsisters, we do so at our own peril.' 8 As described below,
fluidity among these various regimes provides ample opportunities for mischief and
suggests that all forms should be handled in a single, over-arching doctrine, subject
to the variations each area may require.
16 For a history of the law of equity, see MAITLAND, supra note 14; J.H. BAKER, THE
COMMON LAW TRADITION: LAWYERS, BOOKS, AND THE LAW (Hambledon 2000).
17See supra note 10.
18 Charles T.Graves, Non-Competition Covenant as a Category of Intellectual Property Reg-
ulation, 3 HASTINGS SC. & TECH. L.J. 69, 74 (2011) (noting that "in the minds of courts, practi-
tioners, academics and law students, the term 'IP' chiefly means patent and copyright law,
with trademark and trade secret law in the background").
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Finally, I worry that in chronicling existing and potential bad behaviors in an
area that already looks much like the Wild West, I am providing a handy road map
for those who wish to follow. If the legal system does not respond quickly, the article
might do no more than encourage others to enter the fray, as well as providing in-
structions. I am hopeful that the importance of recognizing and responding to these
behaviors outweighs the risk.
II. Magnification and Other Characteristics of the Modern Intellectual
Property Arena
A confluence of factors in intellectual property law is creating unprecedented
opportunities for mischief. To begin with, characteristics of intellectual property
markets are allowing rights holders to bargain for returns well beyond the value of
the rights they hold. In addition, certain intellectual property markets are experienc-
ing a shift to monetization, in which rights that would ordinarily have garnered no
return are being reconstituted and monetized. The combination of magnification and
monetization is creating opportunities for behavior that is harming innovation, creat-
ing dysfunction in markets and wasting vast amounts of resources. This section will
describe such issues in the context of patent and copyright. Later sections will discuss
fluidity among the four intellectual property regimes.
A. Magnification
In the classic story of invention, a great thinker toils to create a wonderful
innovation, files for a patent to protect what he or she has contributed to the store of
human knowledge, and then produces a new product that enters the market, im-
proving the lives of all citizens. In a variation on this theme, the valiant inventor,
deeply immersed in the pursuit of innovation, lacks the capital, experience or interest
to commercialize the invention. The inventor then simply licenses the patent to a
third party, who brings forth the product for the betterment of society. Copyright
tells a similar tale that features brilliant writers hunched over coffeehouse tables, or
dedicated computer programmers toiling late into the night, accompanied only by
caffeine and their dreams.
It is a lovely story, but one that bears little resemblance to the path of patents
and copyrights in the modem world. Modem patent and copyright systems are char-
acterized by extensive bargaining, as parties circle each other looking for advantages
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in a complex game of multi-dimensional chess.19 For different reasons, both systems
are plagued by the following factors: 1) uncertainty regarding the boundaries of
rights; 2) lack of a quick and reasonably priced method for resolving disputes regard-
ing the boundaries of the rights; and 3) potential damages that are out of proportion
to the nature of the harm. These factors allow rights holders to bargain for returns far
beyond the value of those rights. In addition, both systems have operated for some
time with an extraordinary number of rights that are never actualized. Although the
existence of such rights may clog the systems in some ways, those rights have re-
mained largely silent--unasserted and bringing no direct returns to their owners. One
can call these ghost rights or shadow rights, given that they have hovered on the pe-
riphery of the patent and copyright systems, never fully actualized or fleshed out.
The copyright and patent systems are changing dramatically, however, as clever
minds have created new ways for these shadow rights to be monetized. This mone-
tization trend is further enhancing opportunities for magnification of the value of
rights.
Before moving any further one should address the question of how it is con-
ceptually possible for someone to obtain more for something than what it is worth.
After all, isn't the value of something measured by whatever the owner can get in re-
turn for it? How are we to measure value in a rational manner?
Although differing definitions are possible, I suggest using the following as a
starting place. 20 Intellectual property consists of things that are intangible, such as
methods, secrets and songs. Their value is best actualized when the intangible is
translated into tangible products that can be sold to consumers, anything from medi-
cations to CDs. From that perspective, the value of intellectual property can be meas-
ured by the value of the tangible product that embodies it. If the product embodies
things beyond that particular intellectual property, the value can be measured by the
intellectual property's contribution to the value of the tangible product.
This describes, of course, the value of an individual intellectual property
right in an ideal world, and circumstances in the real world are never ideal. Meas-
urement difficulties, information imbalances, transaction costs and other factors may
cause the level of return to deviate from the actual value of the intellectual property.
In addition, the design of the legal system itself, intentionally or unintentionally, may
alter the returns available to the rights holder, above and beyond the value of the
19 For a description of patents in the modern world, see ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING
PATENT LAW, Chapter 2: How Modem Patents Operate (2012).
20 See Raymond Shih Ray Ku et al., Does Copyright Law Promote Creativity? An Empiri-
cal Analysis of Copyright's Bounty, 62 VAND. L. REv. 1669, 1670 (2009); David S. Abrams, Did
Trips Spur Innovation? An Analysis of Patent Duration and Incentives to Innovate, 157 U. PA. L. REv.
1613 (2009).
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right's contribution to the value of the products encompassing it. As a simple exam-
ple, a system may provide for punitive damages or other damage measurements that
intentionally amplify the available returns. Rationally designed, such deviations may
be unproblematic and may follow the types of conscious tradeoffs that are necessary
within any legal structure. It is the unanticipated leakage or the inadequately struc-
tured design that may be problematic.
In short, intellectual property rights holders may be able to utilize aspects of
the patent system to extract a greater return than the value of the right. This phe-
nomenon is happening extensively in both the patent system and the copyright sys-
tem.
B. How Magnification Arises in Patents
Although we refer to patents as a form of intellectual "property," patents are
quite different from traditional forms of property such as real estate. A patent is not a
physical object, but a verbal description of something that may not even exist in tan-
gible form. As a result, it can be very difficult to say exactly what is included within
the boundaries of a given patent, especially as time passes and technology devel-
ops. 21 In fact, as I have described extensively in other work,22 it is simply impossible
to know the full boundaries of a patent at the time the patent is granted.
The sheer volume of modern patents adds to the challenge. The patent sys-
tem allows patents to be overlapping, and the millions of patents active in the United
States makes determining the boundaries of each one impossible. Moreover, the mas-
sive number of patent application filed each year in comparison to the number of pa-
tent examiners ensures that examiners will spend very little time on each application,
leaving the litigation system to weed out patents as they become commercially signif-
icant.
The patent system also lacks a quick and inexpensive way to resolve the un-
certainty about the boundaries of a particular patent. Scholars estimate that the aver-
age patent trial lasts from nine to fifteen months and costs from one to six million
dollars.23 The intangible costs of patent litigation may be as great as the dollar
21 See Robin Feldman, Op-Ed., To Liberate American Innovation, We Need to Rethink Pa-
tents, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 20, 2013.
22 I will describe only a few points in the text and refer readers to prior work for a full
description of the problem. FELDMAN, supra note 19, ch. 1 (describing the theory of the bargain
aspect of patents); see also Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN.
TECH. L. REv. 1, 19-20 (2012), available at http://str.stanford.edu/pdf/feldman-giants-among-
us.pdf (describing how uncertainty promotes leverage in patent aggregation).
23 Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the
Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REv. 1571, 1605 (2009); American Intellectual Property
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amounts, particularly for a young company. Patent litigation can distract manage-
ment, as well as scaring off customers, investors, and suppliers. 24
In addition to the problems of uncertainty and the costs of resolving that un-
certainty, the remedy system in patents can create a distortion between a patent's
value and the return that a patent holder can gain. With a finding of infringement, a
patent holder can receive an injunction against the infringer, and until the recent Su-
preme Court opinion in eBay v. MercExchange, injunctions were routinely granted.25
Although the pace of injunctions has slowed in the wake of eBay, courts still grant
injunctions in a significant number of cases. 26Thus, when a company producing an
actual product is threatened with an infringement claim by a patent holder, the com-
pany must decide whether to risk having its entire product shut down. If the patent
claim relates only to a small aspect of the product, the threat of injunction creates an
inordinate risk, one much more costly than the value that the patent could possibly
contribute to the whole product.
Moreover, the damage measurements available in patent cases significantly
heighten the risk of magnification. According to the Patent Act, courts are to award
damages "adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention."2 7 The language is perfectly
reasonable in the abstract; it is the application of the language that has been prob-
lematic.
Law Association Report of the Economic Survey 2011, reprinted in American Intellectual
Property Law Association Report of the Economic Survey, Intellectual Property Insurance Ser-
vices Corporation, http://www.patentinsurance.com/iprisk/aipla-survey/ (last visited Nov
1, 2012). The average patent trial involving a monetizer lasts about nine months, while the av-
erage patent trial in other circumstances lasts about 15 months.Chien, supra, at 1605, tbl. 6. For
smaller cases where the amount in controversy is under $1 million, the average trial itself costs
almost a million dollars. Id. at 1592-93. For larger cases where the amount in controversy is
greater than $25 million, the average trial costs almost $6 million. Id. at 1584; see also James
Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes 29 tbl. 2 (Boston Univ. Law &
Economics Research Paper No. 12-34, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2091210.
24 Tom Ewing, Indirect Exploitation of Intellectual Property Rights by Corporations and In-
vestors, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 1, 34, 63 (2012) [hereinafter Ewing, Indirect Exploitation];
Tom Ewing, Practical Considerations in the Indirect Deployment of Intellectual Property Rights by
Corporations and Investors, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 109, 119, 131 (2012) [hereinafter Ewing,
Practical Considerations].
2s eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. § 388 (2006).
26 Douglas Ellis et al., The Economic Implications (and Uncertainties) of Obtaining Perma-
nent Injunctive Relief AftereBay v. MercExchange, 17 FED. CiRcurr B.J. 437, 441 (2008). Since June
2006 to 2008 thirty-six patent cases where heard in district courts where a permanent injunc-
tion was being sought. Of those thirty-six, an injunction was granted twenty eight times and
the rest (eight) were denied.
27 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
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Part of the problem flows from the so-called "Georgia-Pacific" test that many
courts use to determine reasonable royalties. It is an elaborate, 15-part test intro-
duced by a district court in the 1970s, in which not all factors are relevant to all cases
and courts do not always use the same factors. 28 With such variability, the test has
been described as involving more the talents of a conjuror than that of a judge.29
The test is particularly troubling in the way that it has been applied to com-
plex multipart products.3 0 When a product is made up of many components, the
price of the product may reflect not just one patented process or component, but also
dozens of other patented inventions. The price may also reflect unpatented technolo-
gy included in the product, as well as the value added by the manufacturer in put-
ting everything together and marketing the product. The Georgia-Pacific test does
not adequately take all of this into account,31 and patented inventions that make a
small contribution to an overall product have received damage awards well beyond
their contribution to the whole, or based on a distorted view of the whole.
For example, in Alcatel-Lucent SA v. Microsoft,32 a jury found that Mi-
crosoft's Media Player, which is a small part of Microsoft's Windows system, violat-
ed two patents related to the MP3 digital-music format. The jury awarded an
astounding $1.52 billion in damages. In reaching this enormous award, the royalty
base was calculated on the full value of Windows-based computers, rather than on
the much lower value of Windows software. 33
28 See Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. § 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
modified sub nom. Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers Inc., 446 F. 2d 295
(2d Cir. 1971).
29 See Fromson v. Western Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1574 (Fed.Cir. 1988) (de-
scribing a practioner's comment).
30 For a detailed description of patent remedies, problems with those remedies and is-
sues discussed in this section, see FELDMAN, supra note 19, at 85-90; see also Mark A. Lemley,
Distinguishing Lost Profits from Reasonable Royalties, 51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 655 (2009); Mark A
Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TExAs L. REV. 1991 (2007).
31 For an example of the ability to garner a return on unpatented parts of a product
through the patent, see Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (de-
scribing the entire market value rule to include recovery on sales of unpatented components
with patented components when the unpatented components function together with the pa-
tented components in a manner so as to produce a single desired end product or result).
32 Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 2d 912 (2007) (granting Mi-
crosoft's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the damages award for insufficient evi-
dence to establish the correct royalty base), affd, 543 F.3d 710 (2008) (affirming judgment as a
matter of law due to lack of standing to sue over one patent and non-infringement on the se-
cond patent, which obviated the need to decide damages issues).
33 Efforts may be underway to ameliorate some aspects of this problem.See Apple, Inc.
v. Samsung Elecs. Co. Ltd, 678 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that there must be a showing
of a causal nexus between likely infringement and the alleged harm to a patentee in order for a
patentee to establish irreparable harm and collect infringement damages).
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Although the court ordered a new trial over damages in Alcatel-Lucent, the
jury verdict in the case is not the only mammoth award that has been handed down.
The threat of such massive awards affects the risk calculations a company must make
in choosing whether to fight the assertion of a patent. Once again, it gives patent
holders the ability to bargain for more than the patent's actual value. Patent holders
can posture by demanding exorbitant licensing rates in demand letters or damage
awards in lawsuits because the risk of such awards is real.
I have wondered whether one could impose some measure of discipline on
the system by requiring that damage award disputes be resolved through baseball
style arbitration. In that system, the parties each enter a number, and the trier of fact
may choose only one of the two numbers offered, not some number in between.34 As
a result, parties have less incentive to enter a ridiculous number, given the risk that
the trier of fact will ignore it and choose what one's opponent has proposed.3 5 Under
the current system, however, the damage calculations encourage parties to inflate
their demands.
The combination of uncertainty regarding the boundaries of rights, the lack
of a quick and inexpensive method for resolving that uncertainty, and the possibility
that damages awarded may be out of proportion to the nature of the harm combine
to make the modem patent system a complex and multi-dimensional strategy game.
I have described this game at length in Rethinking Patent Law, and will include only
a brief discussion here. 36
The problem in simplified form is the following: when a patent holder
knocks on the door, a rational company may choose to settle, rather than to face the
risks and costs of defending against a patent infringement suit. This is true even if
the threatened patent is of questionable validity or does not apply to the product the
company is making. In anticipation of this, companies try to build up their own port-
34 See, e.g., JERRY CuSs, LITIGATION MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK § 9:18 (2012); Matt
Mullarkey, For the Love of the Game: A Historical Analysis and Defense of Final Offer Arbitration in
Major League Baseball, 9 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 234, 238 (2010).
3 See John E. Sands, Baseball Arbitration and the 'Engineering' of Effective Conflict Man-
agement, 13 DisP. RESOL. MAG. 10, 11 (2007) ("Because the players and clubs know the contrac-
tual criteria and know the relevant data for their specific cases, they must design their submit-
ted demands and offers to meet what they believe the arbitration panels will find consistent
with those criteria. Although their initial positions may be far apart, as hearing dates ap-
proach, players and clubs necessarily move those positions into an appropriate range that they
believe an arbitration panel will likely award."). But see Mullarkey, supra note 34, at 239 ("The
lack of compromise created by the arbitration systems encourages the players and owners to
submit increasingly unreasonable proposals knowing that the arbitration panel cannot com-
promise but rather must choose one of the two options.").
36 For a detailed description of how modem patents operate, see FELDMAN, supra note
19, at ch. 3.
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folio of patents. If the person trying to assert a patent against you is a competitor who
wants to keep you out of its territory, you can reach into your portfolio and threaten
to counter-sue. Your counter-attack places the patent holder's own products at risk.
Groups that have large portfolios can be at a greater advantage in the game,
in some circumstances.37 Suppose I knock on your door with a weak patent, asking
that you buy a license from me, or that you shift your product away from what I
claim to control. Now suppose I tell you that I have 500 more patents. Even if you are
tempted to fight the first weak patent, the risks and costs of trying to defend against
each of 500 patents makes it much more likely that you will capitulate. The value of
the first patent, as well as many of the 500, may be quite low, and the patents may be
unlikely to withstand close scrutiny in court. Nevertheless, the patent holder can
reap a substantial return from these patents, particularly if a few stronger patents are
sprinkled throughout.
In the modem world of patent assertion entities have developed a variety of
complex ways to enhance magnification, such as a technique that I would call un-
bundling. With unbundling, an entity takes a group of related patents, separates
them out, and transfers different ones to different monetizers. As a result, a product
company must face multiple demands from different assertion entities. This multi-
plies the amount of cost and risk for the product company, thereby magnifying the
return. In other words, if I have to fight 10 lawsuits, it will cost me more, and the set-
tlement value rises
Unbundling allows the entity that originally divided the group to magnify
its return, either by retaining rights to a share of the profits or simply by virtue of the
fact that the sale price of each decoupled patent reflects its settlement value.3 The
bargaining and maneuvering described above offers only a small taste of the complex
interactions of the modem patent world. 39
37 See, e.g., James F. Holderman & Halley Guren, The Patent Litigation Predicament in
the United States, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 1, 10-11 (2007); Douglas G. Lichtman & Mark A.
Lenley, Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REv. 45, 46 (2007); Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk
Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 66 (2005).
38 Unbundling can be particularly effective as part of a scheme, in which a product
company transfers some of its patents to monetization entities to assert against the product
company's competitors, thereby raising their rivals' costs. For a further discussion of privateer-
ing, see sources cited at note 80, infra.
39 For an example of unbundling, see David A. Balto, Guest Post on Using the Antitrust
Laws to Police Patent Privateering, PATENTLY-O (June 3, 2013) (available at
http:/Ywww.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/06/guest-post-on-using-the-antitrust-laws-to-police-patent-
privateering.html) (describing the transfer of Nokia's patents to patent assertion entity Mosaid,
and the further subdivision of those patents between Mosaid and two other assertion entities).
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C. Monetization in Patents
In addition to the factors cited above, the current rush toward monetization
is contributing to the ability of patent holders to bargain for more than the patent is
worth, as well as creating distortions in the market for patents. Traditionally, the pa-
tent system has operated with a high percentage of what I would call shadow
rights -rights that are never actualized but remain largely invisible, on the periphery
of the patent system.
The vast majority of patents have never directly earned a return for the pa-
tent holder. Estimates suggest that the number is well above 90%.40 These patents do
have some impact on the system. Among other things, they clog the patent system,
making it even more difficult for manufacturers to know whether a potential product
would infringe any existing rights. Nevertheless, they do not extract any direct re-
turns for their inventors.
In fact, many of these shadow patents were never intended to earn a direct
return. When a company patents a particular invention, the company will engage in
a series of defensive patents that are intended to cover variations or improvements
that others could come up with. The intent is not to create new protects, but to keep
others out of the commercial space in which the product is operating, and to protect
the company if competitors try to sue.
Many of these unrealized patents, along with patents in general, are of ques-
tionable validity. The patent approval system has nowhere near the resources neces-
sary to weed out patents that are weak. One scholar estimates that the average patent
examiner spends 18 hours over a period of two to three years examining a particular
patent.41 This is a remarkably small amount of time to evaluate highly technical doc-
uments that may contain dozens or even hundreds of separate claims.
Even patents that have some validity may contain claims that are weak. Pa-
tent drafters generally include very narrow claims that they can safely expect to sur-
vive, and also include a series of increasingly broad claims that reach further and fur-
ther. The broad claims may be tremendously weak, and unlikely to survive in court.
Nevertheless, with the limited amount of time patent examiners have to spend on
each application, the patent office is unlikely to catch all of the claims that reach too
far.
4o Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 37, at 5 (noting that estimates suggest that less
than 5 percent of patents hold any value); see also Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of
the Patent System, 20 J.L. & EcoN. 265, 267 (1977).
Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1495, 1500
(2001).
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Some scholars suggest that the limited patent examination is actually effi-
ciency enhancing.42 Given that we could not possibly afford a deep examination of
each patent application and each claim, it is better to focus societal resources on those
patents that turn out to be important, which can be determined by those that make it
to litigation.
However, if it is too great a burden on the patent office to examine each pa-
tent application extensively, imagine what would happen to the entire patent system
if every patent, or even large numbers of the shadow patents, were to become mone-
tized. That is precisely what is happening in the modern patent system.
The modern combination of Magnification and monetization is playing out
in ways that are inconsistent with the goals of the patent system. The Constitutional
language explains that the goal of the patent system is "to promote the progress. . .
of the useful arts." In other words, patents do not seek to promote for example, sci-
ence for the sake of science, but rather to encourage the creation of products that will
be useful and beneficial to society. Although enormous amounts of money are being
paid through patent assertion, there is no evidence to suggest that much in the way
of new products are emerging from all of the modern patent assertion activity.
One might argue that the system helps return greater sums to inventors,
which has the indirect effect of creating incentives to others who might innovate.
Economic evidence, however, suggests that realtively little of the patent assertion
money is actually returned to inventors.43 Thus, the current system is a remarkably
"leaky bucket."44
1. The Traditional Troll
Monetization behavior began with small numbers of arbitrageurs who
looked for undeveloped patents that could be asserted against successful products.
Known as "patent trolls" or more charitably, "non-practicing entities," these small-
42 See id. See also Christian Bessy & Eric Brousseau, Technology Licensing Contracts: Fea-
tures and Diversity, 18 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 459 (1998); Eric Brousseau & Christian Bessy, Public
and Private Institutions in the Governance of Intellectual Property Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS: INNOVATION, GOVERNANCE, AND THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 243, 251 (Birgitte An-
dersen, ed. 2006); F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of Pre-
sent Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 58 (2003); see also Kelly Casey Mullally, Legal
(Un)certainty, Legal Process, and Patent Law, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1109 (2010).
43 See James E. Bessen, Jennifer Ford & Michael J. Meurer, The Private and Social Costs
of Patent Trolls, REGULATION, Winter 2011-2012, at 26; Bessen & Meurer, supra note 23.
44Professor Carl Shapiro used this wonderfully expressive phrase to explore the im-
plications of the patent assertion in his comments at the FTC/DOJ Workshop on Patent Asser-
tion Entities in December of 2012.
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scale operations generated tremendous returns, without producing a single product.
Scholars and commentators have argued over what to call these players and how to
categorize them. Universities, for example, are technically non-practicing entities.
They generally license out the inventions created in their labs, rather than "practic-
ing" the patent to manufacture a product. University behavior on the whole, howev-
er, tends to be quite different from that of garden-variety trolls, and some commenta-
tors are uncomfortable grouping them together.45
I have suggested using the term "patent monetization entities" for these
players and their fellow travellers. It has the virtue of capturing the notion that the
entity is specifically designed and intended for monetizing patents, and it leaves out
universities, whose core activities differ significantly from this group. 46
2. New Forms of Patent Monetization Entities
Over the last five years, new types of patent monetization entities have
emerged. These entities are bigger and much more complex than the original patent
trolls. Moreover, the phenomenon of patent monetization has spread from a limited
number of individual players, to a large number of entities of varying configurations.
These new arrivals include mass aggregators, who operate in part as patent
defense clubs, protecting their members against operating companies who would as-
sert patents against them. The mass aggregators, however, also operate as monetiz-
ing organizations, promising large returns to their members and investors. The larg-
est and most secretive, Intellectual Ventures, has amassed at least the 5th largest
patent portfolio of any domestic company and has done so in about five years.4 7
Variations on the theme abound. Some operating companies have entered
the patent monetization game by either creating subsidiaries to manage their intellec-
tual property portfolios or transferring their intellectual property to third parties,
who purchase the patents either for an infusion of cash or for a return on the moneti-
zation activities of the third-party.
The explosion in monetization activities is creating pressure on corporate
counsels at all companies to find ways to monetize their intellectual property portfo-
lio, particularly their patents. With pressure from the Board to maximize immediate
45Jaconda Wagner, Patent Trolls and the High Cost of Litigation to Business and Start-Ups
- A Myth?, XLV Md. B.J. 12,14 (2012); see also Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611,612 (2008).46See Sara Jeruss, Robin Feldman & Joshua Walker, The America Invents Act 500: Effects
of Patent Monetization Entities on U.S. Litigation, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 357, 361 (2012).
For a detailed description of mass aggregators and the potential anticompetitive ef-
fects, see Ewing & Feldman, supra note 22.
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revenue, along with numerous approaches from IP brokers offering to buy or mone-
tize portions of the company's portfolio, it can be difficult for corporate counsel to
take the long-term view of the company's interests. In particular, if everyone is get-
ting on board, shouldn't we join or at least hedge our bets?
The situation is reminiscent of a wonderful letter written by an anonymous
tax lawyer to the Commissioner of the IRS in the 1990s.48 Signed with the moniker,
"Rusty Pipes," the letter described the fictitious tribulations of a simple, honest
plumber as he watched others cut safety corners, split the cost savings with their cli-
ents, and react in horror when anti-abuse rules were introduced.
The temptation to monetize is spawning a variety of new entities. For exam-
ple, Wired magazine recently interviewed a "reverse engineer" working for a mone-
tization entity called "Rockstar Consortium."49 Rockstar Consortium is funded by
companies such as Apple, Microsoft, Research in Motion, Sony, and Ericsson. Re-
verse engineers at Rockstar study successful products like routers and smartphones
looking for ways to claim that the successful product infringes one of Rockstar's
thousands of patents. Rockstar then contacts the company and demands a license
fee.50
As monetization activities and variants are expanding rapidly, the activity
feeds on itself in ways both large and small. For a small example, consider the inven-
tor who had sued an operating company for infringing his patent. The inventor re-
ceived a call from an old friend, now at a patent monetizer, who explained that pur-
chasing the patent or a blanket license might be of interest to the monetizer. If the
inventor wanted to proceed, however, he would need to file lawsuits against many
more of the aggregator's members, to ensure that the purchase was of sufficient in-
terest to the group. Individual moments like these are a reminder of the gold rush
atmosphere of today's patent monetization. Everyone is scrambling for a piece of the
action -for themselves, for their businesses, for their friends -and there are very few
rules in place.
These patent monetization entities and their potential effects on the patent
market and the broader economy are fascinating topics.51 Nevertheless, the point for
the purpose of this article is the following: The patent system has long operated with
the comfort of knowing that only a tiny percentage of patents will ever earn a return.
In our brave new world, large numbers of patents, that would not have garnered any
48See The Timeless Wisdom of Rusty Pipes, TAx NoTES TODAY, Dec. 21, 1998.
49See Robert McMillan, How Apple and Microsoft Armed 4,000 Patent WarheadsWIRED,
May 21, 2012, available at http://www.wired.com/wiredenterprise/2012/05/rockstar/all/1.
50 d.
s1 Ewing & Feldman, supra note22; Bessen & Meurer, supra note 23; Chien, supra note
23.
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return in the past, are being traded and monetized. Their presence in the market, par-
ticularly in the form of commoditized, tradable rights, enhances the uncertainty and
game playing that allows patent holders to obtain rights above the value of patent
itself.
3. Can Monetization Impact Biotech and Pharma?
Conventional wisdom in patent circles holds that patent trolling and moneti-
zation are primarily a high tech problem -not one that affects the biotech and phar-
maceutical industries. It is certainly true that certain aspects of life in the world of
health science invention make the environment less hospitable to monetization. For
example, a new medicine may be protected by one key patent on the molecule or the
chemical formulation, rather than the hundreds of patents one can find in a typical
high-tech product. In addition, timing is quite different in the two industries, both in
terms of lead time and in terms of shelf life. A blockbuster drug requires years of ex-
pensive investment to develop the drug and take it through the arduous process of
testing and approval. Once on the shelves, however, it can remain a force in the mar-
ketplace throughout the life of the patent. In contrast, many high-tech products can
be invented cheaply and easily. Their shelf life may be considerably shorter as well,
with market trends making them obsolete long before the patent has expired.
Finally, the startup costs for entering the high-tech market are lower than in
biotech and pharmaceuticals. One is far less likely to find inventors making medical
devices out of their garages. As a result, there may be fewer inventors in the field,
outside of operating companies and universities.
It is only a matter of time, however, before monetizers find their way into bi-
otech and pharma, using weak or tangential patents to extract payments from com-
panies with useful products on the market.5 2 A monetizer would not need to raise the
specter of being a legitimate competitor in the market in order to extract value from
existing products. Rather, the amount of investment necessary to bring a product to
market would make bio and pharma companies particularly appealing targets. What
difference is a small settlement payment when one is on the cusp of approval?
In addition, the vast amount of unused innovation from universities offers a
particularly tempting watering hole. Spurred by the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, which
gave universities the right to patent inventions that benefitted from federal funding,
university patent holdings have mushroomed over time, with very few of the patents
ever being licensed. This could provide an enormous shopping mall for monetizers,
52 Feldman, supra note2l.
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who could roam through their wares looking for patents to assert against successful
products.
If such behavior takes off, it would be a sad twist to the Bayh-Dole Act. The
Act, which was intended to encourage translation of academic research into new
products for consumers, would become the vehicle for adding a tax on existing
products - one that would most likely be paid in higher consumer prices.
There are early signs that monetization is finding its way into the biotech and
pharmaceutical markets. For example, it is not difficult to find evidence that patent
monetizers are purchasing patents from universities---patents that were obtained for
inventions created with federal funds. For example, the PTO assignment database
shows that CalTech sold a large group of patents to Intellectual Ventures in Septem-
ber of 2008.' Looking at one of those patents at random, one can see that it contains
the standard notice that the invention was created pursuant to grants from the Na-
tional Science Foundation.5 4
In another sign of things to come, I spoke to a patent broker recently, who is
ordinarily in the business of monetizing high-technology portfolios. He has been
asked, however, by a major pharmaceutical company to shop their non-core patent
portfolio. Pandora's box has been opened, and it will not be easy to close.55
D. Magnification and Monetization in Copyright
The copyright system manifests some of the same characteristics of uncer-
tainty of boundaries, high cost of dispute resolution, and the risk of costly remedies
as patents. Although the details of these characteristics differ substantially from the
way in which they arise in the patent system, these characteristics foster the same
type of magnification, in which the rights holder can bargain for more than the value
of the copyrighted work. Copyright is also experiencing aggregation and monetiza-
tion schemes, although not nearly as large and widespread as in patents.
53 http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/q?db=pat&reel=022117&frame=0805
54 The patent is US 7,023,435, "Object surface representation and related methods and
systems." It contains the statement that "The U.S. Government has certain rights in this inven-
tion pursuant to Grant Numbers ACI-9721349 and DMS-9874082 awarded by the National Sci-
ence Foundation." See [insert proper citation for Patent], available at
http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nphParser?Sectl=PTOI&Sect2=HITOFF&d=PALL&p=1&u=
%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsrchnum.htm&r=1&f=G&l=50&sl=7023435.PN.&OS=PN/7023435&
RS=PN/7023435. I wish to thank Tom Ewing for providing these examples. See also Arti K Rai
& Bhaven N. Sampat, Accountability in Patenting of Federally Funded Research, 30 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 953 (2012) (describing some of the concerns arising out of these types of sales
to monetization entities, including stifling innovation generally).
55 See Feldman, supra note 21.
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Copyright protects the manner in which an idea is expressed. It is not the
idea itself that we protect but rather the way the author chooses to express that
idea.56 Thus, copyright protects something that is intangible, and understanding the
boundaries of something that is intangible is inherently subject to uncertainty.
Moreover, the legal rules themselves contribute to the atmosphere of uncer-
tainty, particularly the notorious doctrine of fair use. Fair use is a complete defense to
an action of copyright infringement. It is a fact-intensive balancing test in which the
statutory factors listed are not exclusive, and the courts have determined that no one
factor is dispositive.57
A fact-intensive balancing test of this type, all but guarantees a high degree
of uncertainty, particularly when the factors are open-ended. Fair use definitely fol-
lows that prediction. Most fair use cases that have been decided by the Supreme
Court have been decided 5-4, in a decision that reversed a court of appeals decision,
which had reversed the trial court opinion. In the realm of fair use, certainty is not
ours, nor is predictability.
The costs for determining whether infringement has occurred are not neces-
sarily as great for copyright as for patent. Copyright cases do not routinely incur the
extensive expert costs and drawn out pre-trial battles that characterize patent cases.58
In particular, the Copyright Act allows infringers to elect statutory damages, rather
than proving actual damages, which can eliminate the need for complex testimony
on damages.59 In addition, the copyright system manifests particular mechanisms,
some legislative and some market-based, that facilitate licensing of rights.60 Never-
theless, any system in which a key determination is subject to such variability is
56 For example, the idea of a story about two star-crossed lovers from feuding families
with a tragic ending is not copyrightable, but the dialogue, plot sequence, and the way the in-
teraction among the characters unfolds is copyrightable. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NIMMER, LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 13.03(A)(1)(b) (1963).
Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1993), cited with approval
in Asset Mktg. Sys., Inc. v. Gagnon, 542 F.3d 748, 758 n.5 (9th Cir. 2008), and Wall Data Inc. v.
Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 447 F.3d 769, 778-779 (9th Cir. 2006).
58 "The Eastern District of Virginia is known as the 'rocket docket' because civil ac-
tions move to trial or are otherwise resolved. As Pragmatus [the plaintiff] notes in its opposi-
tion brie, the mediam time for the filing of a civil action to its final disposition in this district is
10 months, compared to 26.2 months in the Northern District of Calfomia."Pragmatus AV,
LLC v. Facebook, Inc., 769 F. Supp. 2d 991, 996 (E.D. Va. 2011); see also Polaroid Corp. v East-
man Kodak Co, which took 15 years to reach settlement; Robert W. Kearns v. Ford Motor
Company,which took 12 years to reach a settlement [need full case cites for these two].
17 U.S.C.A. § 504 (West 2006).
6 See Broadcast Music Inc. ("BMI") which collects license fees from businesses that
use music, which it distributes as royalties to songwriters, composers and music publishers;
The American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers ("ASCAP") which also protects
the rights of its members by licensing and distributing royalties for copyrighted works.
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bound to engender a fair degree of uncertainty, above and beyond the uncertainty
that accompanies any litigation.
Remedies within the copyright system also amplify the potential returns, ex-
panding them beyond the value of a copyright's contribution to a product.61 As with
patents, courts routinely grant injunctions in copyright infringement cases, and are
even more likely to grant preliminary injunctions in copyright than in other types of
cases.62 Moreover, legislation such as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act raises the
specter of criminal sanctions as well as civil sanctions--a threat that can be particular-
ly unnerving for individuals accused of infringement. 63
Finally, the copyright system manifests an additional characteristic that pro-
vides opportunities for magnification. Specifically, there is a strange mismatch be-
tween cultural norms and the law's dictates in the copyright system. Individuals
regularly engage in copyright infringement--sharing songs with friends, download-
ing music and movies illegally, incorporating copyrighted material into their web-
sites and electronic communications, and photocopying written materials to hand
out in classes, lectures, and meetings. One can speculate about whether this rampant
infringement reflects a culture of thieving and lawlessness or a popular protest of the
overbroad nature of copyright law.M It could also reflect a variety of other social
6 Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Uneasy Case Against Copyright Trolls, 86 S. CAL. L.
REv.59 (2013) (noting that copyright trolls always elect statutory damages through which they
are essentially guaranteed a meaningful recovery.)
62 Seeid.;see also ARTHUR R. MILLER & MICHAEL M. DAVIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHT § 26.1 (West 2012) (5thed.).
63 17 U.S.C.A. § 1204 (West 2006). Simply must violate section § 1201 or § 1202 will-
fully and for commercial gain.
6 Ben Depoorter, Alain van Hiel & Sven Vanneste, Copyright Backlash, 84 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1251 (2011) (analyzing the results of two different conducted studies to find that enforce-
ment measures which are seen as normatively excessive may lead individuals to believe that a
legal rule is unjust, and create a social backlash that could prove counterproductive to copy-
right); Daniel J. Gervais, The Price of Social Norms: Towards a Liability Regime for File-Sharing, 12 J.
INTELL. PRop. L. 40 (2003) ("Could it be that what some institutions wrongly perceived as sim-
ple intellectual property theft - which should be fought in the same way as, say, shoplifting -
could also and simultaneously be portrayed as a new form of interest-based social interac-
tion?"); Yuval Feldman & Janice Nadler, The Law and Norms of File Sharing, 43 SAN DIEGo L.
REV. 577 (2006) ("In certain areas of life, there are many easy opportunities to violate the law
where the resulting harm is apparently minimal; the presence of ready opportunity and ab-
sence of serious harm make such iolations common. In extreme cases, violating the law is the
norm."); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New Eco-
nomics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (2002) (describing current social norms and
explaining that many individuals believe that punishment for file sharing and copying copy-
righted material for personal use is an infringement of their liberty interests, such that alleging
copyright infringement in these scenarios is not an appropriate remedy).
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phenomena. 65 Regardless of the explanation, the significant gulf between legal rules
and societal norms in copyright adds to the magnification power within the system.
For example, many individuals are generally aware that they are -violating
copyright regulations, regulations they may view as inappropriate or burdensome.
When faced with an accusation of infringement, it is possible that people simply ca-
pitulate regardless of the legitimacy of the claim, agreeing to the terms required or
relinquishing the settlement demanded. This is particularly true in light of the differ-
ing characteristics of those who may be claiming copyright infringement and those
who may be defending themselves from it. The size of the potential damages may
encourage copyright infringers to settle quickly. Under the Copyright Act copyright
holders can elect to ask for statutory damages instead of actual damages. Statutory
damages can range between $750 and $30,000, and if the infringement is willful,
damages may increase to as much as $150,000 per work.66 Thus, even if damages are
minimal, for example, when the cost of the allegedly illegal copy is only one or two
dollars, the threat of statutory damages looms much larger. Although criminal prose-
cutions are rare and unlikely to apply to most cases of infringement by individuals, 67
the specter of criminal sanctions may increase the psychological pressure for settle-
ment, regardless of whether the settlement request is justified.
E.' Shadow Rights in Copyright
As with the patent system, the copyright system has existed for some time
with a significant percentage of shadow rights, that is, rights that are never actual-
ized or enforced in any manner. The phenomenon takes shape differently in copy-
right than in patent, but the result is similar.
Two factors in modern history have greatly accelerated the sheer volume of
unactualized copyrights. First, in an effort to conform to international norms and
treaty obligations, the United States eliminated the requirements of notice and regis-
For example, to offer an analogy, although most people disobey speeding laws,
they may generally agree that such laws are necessary and appropriate. Similarly, copyright
infringers may generally agree that current copyright provisions are necessarily, while ignor-
ing them.
66 17 U.S.C. § 504 (West 2006); Capitol Records, Inc. v Thomas-Rasset, 692 F. 3d 899 (8th
Cir. 2012) (in which a mother was fined 1.9 million dollars by a jury for sharing 24 songs on the
peer-to-peer network Kazaa.)
67 See 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2000) (providing criminal penalties for those who willfully in-
fringe for the purpose of commercial advantage). Criminal penalties in copyright are not used
frequently as it is difficult to prove "willful infringement."See U.S. v. Moran, 757 F. Supp 1046
(D. Neb. 1991). Defendant made an illegal copy of a video cassette and the court determined it
was not willful.
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tration in 1989.68 Prior to that time, for copyright to attach, an author had to place a
copyright notice on a work and deposit a copy with Library of Congress.69 Since
1989, copyright has attached the moment that a work is fixed in a tangible medium of
expression, and fixation occurs when a work is written down, photographed, or oth-
erwise recorded. Elimination of notice and requirement has meant that a vast num-
ber of moments of expression have fallen under the protection of copyright.
Second, the explosion of digital technology and digital communication
methods has exponentially increased the number of works subject to copyright. Peo-
ple are constantly fixing things in a tangible medium of expression, things that
would have remained inchoate in prior generations. Rather than making a phone call
or engaging in a personal conversation, we email, text and Tweet. We record every
moment of our friends and children's lives in still and video format, either capturing
them unaltered, or manipulating them using ever-easier tools to produce our own
movies, websites and self-published works. Although the amount of copyright pro-
tection may be thinner in some of these circumstances, thinner protection often relies
on the ever-elusive fair use doctrine.
These changes have spawned an astoundingly vast amount of material that
may be subject to claims of copyright -claims that, for the most part, are never actu-
alized. How many of us have ever brought, or even considered, a claim of copyright
infringement based on the mass of fixed material we have in our lives?
Modern technology also increases the potential for harvesting copyright
claims. Data mining tools may allow content creators to actualize their increasingly
large numbers of rights -rights that would have previously remained unasserted.
Aggregation techniques may further boost the harvesting of copyright
claims. Although aggregation in copyright has not yet developed as extensively as in
patent, there is evidence of significant aggregation activity. And of course, copy-
right's version of magnification brings opportunities for mischief, as described
above.
III. Troubling Schemes
The following section discusses a variety of troubling behaviors that are
emerging in intellectual property markets. The examples included are not isolated
Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853
(codified as amended in various sections of 17 U.S.C.).
69US Copyright Office - Registering a Work (uly 16, 2012),
http://www.copyright.gov/help/faq/faq-register.html (last visited January 8, 2013).
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incidents, but appear to represent standard behaviors or trends in intellectual proper-
ty rights interactions.
The examples were chosen for inclusion because the behavior trails are rela-
tively easy to follow. I note that some of the examples track allegations in filings be-
fore courts and regulatory agencies, rather than final determinations of fact. At the
very least, these offer insights into the types of behaviors that are possible under our
current system and that our system would be ineffective at counteracting.
A. The Barnes & Noble Saga: The Power of Silence
Barnes & Noble manufactures the Nook electronic reader, which allows us-
ers to read electronic versions of books on a handheld device.70 The Nook uses the
Android operating system, based on the open source Linux system.71 Other devices,
including a variety of smart-phones, also use the Android operating system.
Microsoft produces the Windows operating system. Windows competes with
Linux-based systems in a variety of markets including, smartphones and electronic
readers.
Federal court filings by Barnes & Noble, as well as a letter to the Department
of Justice, detail the following saga between Barnes & Noble and Microsoft. 72 In 2010,
Microsoft approached Barnes & Noble saying that the Nook infringed six of Mi-
crosoft's patents. Patents generally include numerous independent claims, and it is
rarely clear which claim might be relevant or why a patent holder might be asserting
that a particular patent infringes a product. Normally, the patent holder would pro-
vide additional information about which claims it believes are infringed by the prod-
70 I will refer to these collectively as "the Nook" except where there is a difference be-
tween the two for the specific issue discussed. This type of device in general may be referred to
as an "eBook reader." As with other computer-like devices, the Nook uses an operating sys-
tem, similar to the way that desktop computers may use Windows, Linux, or an Apple operat-
ing system.
71 The Android operating system is a Linux based operating system designed primar-
ily for touchscreens. Android is an open source program that allows users to freely modify
existing code and redistribute it. http:/ /developer.android.com/index.html (last visited Janu-
ary 8, 2013).
72 Microsoft Corp. v. Barnes & Noble Inc., No. 2:11-CV-00485 RAJ (W.D. Wash. Apr
25, 2011); Letter from Gene DeFelice, Vice President, General Counsel & Secretary, Barnes &
Noble, to James J. Tierney, Chief, Networks & Technology Enforcement Section Antitrust Divi-
sion, United States Department of Justice (Apr. 25, 2011), available at Certain Handheld Elec-
tronic Computing Devices, Related Software and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-769,
USITC Doc. ID 463533, Exhibit B (File ID 675083). (Nov. 7, 2011) (Settled) [hereinafter B&N An-
swer and B&N Letter to DOJ].
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uct so that the target company can make an assessment of whether to pay for a li-
cense. Gamesmanship over claims, however, is not uncommon in the patent world. 3
In this case, Microsoft refused to provide any details unless Barnes & Noble
signed a non-disclosure agreement. Barnes & Noble objected, given that the claims
are public information.
One could imagine a patent holder arguing that the while the claims are pub-
lic, the patent holder's litigation approach and strategy are private. After all, the pa-
tent holder may intend to assert similar claims against other device-makers whose
devices use the Android operating system. Publication of a patent, however, is in-
tended to provide notice to all of the territory the patent holder controls.7 4 Alleging
confidentiality for what one asserts is the territory covered by one's patent is in ten-
sion with the notice function of a patent.
After considerable back and forth, the parties eventually agreed to a limited
non-disclosure agreement that would cover "any non-public claim charts provided to
Barnes & Noble by Microsoft relating to the patents in dispute."7 5 Despite Microsoft's
insistence that the charts must be covered by a non-disclosure agreement, however,
the charts delivered did not contain any private information.
According to the filing, the patents discussed at the meeting were not essen-
tial patents for the Android operating systems, but rather minor peripheral patents.
For example, the asserted patents concerned making file names for modern operating
systems compatible with file names for outmoded operating systems and simulating
mouse inputs using non-mouse devices.
Barnes & Noble has asserted that Microsoft asked for a remarkably high li-
cense fee at the meeting,76 with the proposed fee amounting to more than what Mi-
crosoft was charging for its entire operating system for mobile devices. The meeting
7 For an example of a common technique in patent licensing negotiation, see generally
Jason Rantanen, 3M v. Avery: Walking the Line of Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction, PATENTLY-O,
Mar. 29, 2012 (describing suit in which patent holder sent letter that a 3M product "may in-
fringe" and that "licenses are available" but refused to provide claim chart information in the
hopes of waving patents without giving the accused infringer sufficient cause to bring a de-
claratory judgment action to declare the patents invalid), available at
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/03/3m-v-avery-walking-the-line-of-declaratory-
judgment-)urisdiction.html.
735 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
7 B&N Answer (paragraph 18, lines 14-16).
Letter from Gene DeFelice, Vice President, General Counsel & Secretary, Barnes &
Noble, to James J. Tierney, Chief, Networks & Tech.Technology Enforcement Section Antitrust
Div. Division, United States Department Dep't Department of Justice - Exhibit B (Apr. 25,
2011), available at http://www.groklaw.net/articlebasic.php?story=2011111122291296 (last
visited Jan. 8, 2013).
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was unsuccessful, and a few months later, Microsoft filed an infringement action
against Barnes & Noble.n
A year after the lawsuit was filed, the two parties announced a deal in which
Microsoft would pay $300 million dollars for a 17.6% stake in the Nook division. This
gave the Nook division a desperately needed cash infusion. As part of the deal, the
parties agreed to settle their patent disputes and to produce a Nook application for
Windows. 79
The sequence of events raises questions about the appropriate use of intellec-
tual property. If the patents were indeed peripheral to the operating system, it is
doubtful that their contribution to the Nook product constituted anything close to the
value of an entire operating system. Asking for that amount, however, could have
the effect of encouraging device makers to switch operating systems. If I can get the
entire operating system for roughly what I have to pay for a few minor pieces of my
current one, it would certainly make economic sense to switch. In that case, if the al-
legations are correct one could argue that the patent holder used minor patents to in-
timidate a competitor's customer and induce the customer to move to the patent
holder's product. As a colleague noted wryly, this would be a marvelous way to at-
tack a competing platform: threaten, litigate, drive down share price, buy company
cheap, and get platform adopted.
Insistence on non-disclosure agreements raises serious concerns as well. As
noted above, demanding confidentiality for what one claims is the territory covered
by one's patent should be antithetical to the notice function of a patent in most cir-
cumstances. A confidentiality provision, however, may serve even more troubling
aims. One could imagine that a non-disclosure agreement under such circumstances
could be intended to shield inappropriate actions from view in an effort to protect
the patent holder from potential antitrust charges. Cloaking one's actions in non-
disclosure agreements makes it more difficult for public and private antitrust actors
to make the necessary connections between different transactions that could reveal a
pattern of anticompetitive conduct emerges. In that case, intellectual property is be-
ing used to shield anticompetitive behavior.
n In July 2010, Microsoft first met with Barnes & Noble to discuss patent issues relat-
ed to the Nook. In December 2010, they met to discuss Microsoft's patent infringement claims
against the Barnes & Noble Nook.
Michael J. De La Merced & Julie Bosman, Microsoft To Take Stake in Nook Unit of
Barnes & Noble, N.Y. TIMEs (Apr. 30, 2012),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/30/microsoft-to-take-stake-in-barnes-nobles-nook-
unit/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2013).
79 See id.
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This could be particularly problematic if the full picture of a scheme can only
emerge across different transactions involving different parties. Under those circum-
stances, swearing each party to silence makes it very difficult for anyone to see the
full picture. It may also delay recognition until the perpetrator's position is secured
or the scheme is too far advanced for much to be done.
Judges themselves may be unwitting participants in this veil of silence.
Courts seem to be quite willing to seal documents in these cases, reducing the ability
of observers to see patterns of troubling behavior emerge across litigations.
The complexity and sophistication of modern patent schemes makes it par-
ticularly difficult for public and private antitrust actors to follow the trail. Not only
are patent monetization entities transferring patents to operating companies so that
the operating companies can use the patents in litigation, operating companies are
also transferring their intellectual property to third-party monetization entities,
sometimes as part of elaborate anticompetitive schemes.80 Known as privateering,
this practice can be an effective method of raising rival's costs and maintaining one's
position on the marketplace. In this context, silence can help keep meddlesome gov-
ernment regulators and the private antitrust bar off your back.
Questionable requirements of silence are appearing in a variety of intellectu-
al property contexts. Consider Intellectual Ventures, the largest and most secretive of
the mass aggregators. Intellectual Ventures has assets of at least $5 billion and is es-
timated to own the fifth largest patent portfolio of any domestic U.S. company.8 ' It
has been extraordinarily difficult to get a picture of the entity and its activities, in
part because of the more than 1,000 shell companies that Intellectual Ventures has es-
tablished and, in part, because of the entity's non-disclosure agreements. Those who
interact with Intellectual Ventures, either as investors, participants in its patent pools,
or suppliers of patents, must sign strict non-disclosure agreements.
The entity's efforts to reign in disclosure appear to have been quite effective.
As one reporter noted: " [W]e called people who had licensing arrangements with [In-
so For descriptions of "privateering" in the intellectual property world, that is, incen-
tivizing third parties to attack one's enemies, see Ewing, Indirect Exploitation, and Ewing, Practi-
cal Considerations, supra note 24. For a detailed description of mass aggregators, often consist-
ing of competitor groups, and anticompetitive concerns, see Ewing & Feldman, supra note 22.
For additional stories on operating companies creating or interacting with monetizing entities,
see Ashby Jones, Patent "Troll" Tactics Spread, WALL ST J. (Jul. 9, 2012) (describing how operat-
ing companies are spinning off technology to monetization entities to pursue patent claims
against other companies); Andrew Tarantola, Nokia Just Sold Hundreds of Its "Essential" Wireless
Patents, GIzMoDO, Jan. 13, 2012, available at http://gizmodo.com/5876068/nokia-just-sold-
hundreds-of-its-essential-wireless-patents (describing sale of Nokia patents to an aggressive
monetization entity).
8 For a detailed description of Intellectual Ventures and other mass aggregators, see
Ewing & Feldman, supra note 22.
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tellectual Ventures], we called people who were defendants in lawsuits involving [In-
tellectual Ventures] patents, we called every single company being sued by Oasis Re-
search. No one would talk to us."8 2
Even more troubling, I spoke to one government regulator who said that at
least some of the Intellectual Ventures agreements contain not only non-disclosure
clauses, but also non-disparagement clauses. In other words, those who interact with
Intellectual Ventures would not be permitted to say anything that is at all critical
about the entity, regardless of whether the comments disclose any information about
the business dealings. Not surprisingly, I have been unable to confirm whether the
claim is accurate, but it does raise serious concerns even as a hypothetical. There
would be something deeply disturbing if a large and powerful entity were able to
use its vast intellectual property assets to silence potential criticism. Our current sys-
tem would not stem this type of behavior.
A variation on the patent non-disparagement clauses has been noted in the
copyright context as well. Hospitals and other health care providers operate through
complicated health information technologies, often provided by outside vendors. The
vendor contracts mandate that the hospital may not disclose errors, bugs, design
flaws or other software-related hazards.83 In other words, in order to use my copy-
righted software, you must agree not to tell anyone about any problems in the soft-
ware. Health care practitioners have expressed concern that they cannot even share
information about errors in a program, such as the way a program calculates dosages
or a patient weight, with other organizations they work with, even if those errors
could lead to serious patient harm.84
The problem of non-disparagement or do-not-criticize clauses is particularly
disturbing in light of the origin of the power being exercised. In a society that prizes
freedom of speech, it would be particularly troubling if intellectual property, created
and granted by the sovereign, were being used to negotiate for, or even impose, re-
strictions on free flowing discourse.
Improper use of non-disclosure agreements is a good example of why a doc-
trine of inappropriate use of intellectual property would have to include all forms of
82 Alex Blumberg & Laura Sydell, This American Life: When Patents Attack, NAT'L PUB.
RADIO, July 22, 2011, available at
http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2011/07/25/138576167/when-patents-attack.
83 See Kenneth W. Goodman et al., Challenges in Ethics, Safety, Best Practices and Over-
sight Regarding HIT Vendors, their Customers, and Patients: A Report of the AMIA Special Task
Force, 18 LAM. MED. INFORMATIcs ASs'N. 77 (2011).
See id.; Ross Koppel & David Kreda, Health Care Information Technology Vendors'
"Hold Harmless" Clause: Implications for Patients and Clinicians, 301 J. AM. MED. Ass'N. 1276, 1277-
78 (2009).
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intellectual property. Patent holders routinely draft contracts to cover not just the pa-
tent itself, but also trade secrets and things called "know-how" and "show-how."
Many of these contracts are drafted so that issues that have the potential of running
afoul of patent laws are conveniently placed under trade secrets. Thus, without uni-
versal coverage of the notion of inappropriate use, parties would simply draft their
contracts so that the non-disclosure clauses are justified for purposes unrelated to the
patents.
B. Using Patent Schemes for Insulation
Perhaps one of the most useful aspects of patent monetization entities is that
they create an offensive weapon that can be used against opposing parties without
creating opportunities for the opposing parties to respond. Normally, if a company
that actually makes a product wants to threaten patent litigation against another
company that makes a product, there is a risk that the target will file counter-claims,
waving its own patent portfolio and threatening the first company's products. Thus,
the most powerful position for launching a patent strike against another company is
when one does not have any products at risk. Patent monetization entities are the
perfect vehicles because they do not produce any products at all. An operating com-
pany can create a monetization entity with its intellectual property, drop the assets
into it, and then allow the entity to go after targets -thereby insulating the company
from any counter-offensive. These entities are the perfect attack dog, with little at risk
in the way of either vulnerable products or other assets that could be attached if a
court wanted to award attorneys fees or other penalties. Of course, all of this litiga-
tion certainly is not helping consumers.8 5 Vast amounts of societal resources are
wasted in the course of all of this positioning and patent battling.
Monetization entities not only insulate companies from patent counter-
attacks, they may also insulate companies in other ways. For example, transferring
intellectual property from a US subsidiary to a foreign parent can create a layer of
protection against discovery. Courts have ruled that where the parent is a foreign
corporation, even when the subsidiary is a US corporation, documentation in the
hands of the parent are beyond the subpoena power in litigation, and the parties
must proceed according the Hague Convention.86 One practitioner noted that they
85 Josh Kosman, Patently False: Critics Calling Out Deal by Microsoft & Nokia Over Anti-
trust Alarms, N.Y. PosT, Sept. 15, 2011 (citing Michael Carrier), available at
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/business/patently-false E4uHQUFC5XLDMmKgM7wb8K
8 See, e.g., Ethypharm S.A. France v. Abbott Labs, C.A. No. 08-126-SLR-MPT, Memo-
randum Order Regarding Discovery Matters (D. Del. Nov. 15, 2010) at 11, available at
http.-www.scribd.condoc/43887138/Ethypharm-S-A-France-v-Abbott-Laboratories-C-A-No-08-126-
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encountered this stumbling block when Sony and Nokia transferred their patents to a
87foreign monetization entity.
In addition, concerns have been raised about patent transfers that could have
the effect of "laundering" the original patent holder's commitments to a standards
setting body. 8 When a particular patent constitutes an essential patent under a
standards agreement, the patent holder generally must license the patent to all on
fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms, also known as "FRAND." The stand-
ards setting body's rules may also specify that the patent holder should ensure that
its obligations carry forward with any assignment of the patent. This, however, may
not always happen, and it is not clear, for example, that a bankruptcy court or trustee
must require that patents transferred in bankruptcy continue to observe prior obliga-
tions to a standards setting body.8 9
Similarly, although standards setting bodies may require that when patent
holders transfer their essential patents, the transfer agreement specifies that the new
owner will maintain the FRAND and other standards-related obligations of the prior
owner, enforcement may be less than ideal.90 For example the Institute of Electrical
and Electronics Engineers Standards Association ("IEEE-SA"), a major electronics
standards setting body in the United States, has the power to revoke a member's
privileges or even withdraw the member's patent from the standard, if a member
fails to comply with its obligations. 91 This, however, may have little impact. A stand-
ard may already be so entrenched in the technology that revocation would have little
effect.92 In addition, if a member has gone bankrupt or has otherwise left the field,
revoking the member's privileges may be irrelevant.
IEEE-SA could still have an impact on the party who has received the patent
by withdrawing the patent from the standard, but again, this action is only effective
if the standard is not already entrenched. Any further enforcement is left to other
members, who have the right to bring suit, but a member must be willing individual-
ly to shoulder a burden from which all will benefit.
SLRMPT-D-Del-Nov-15-2010.
87 See infra text accompanying note 184 (explaining the larger context of the transac-
tion). 88 Letter from Steve Mills, IEEE Standards Ass'n, to Donald S. Clark, Secretary, Fed.
Trade Comm'n, Association - Re: Patent Standards Workshop, Project No. P11 1204, (Aug. 5,
2011) [hereinafter IEEE Letter], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/patentstandardsworkshop/00046-80184.pdf (last visited
Jan. 8, 2013), at 8.
8 See id. at 9.
90 FoT an example of avoiding FRAND commitments through transfer of patents, see
supra note 39.
91 For a description of IEEE compliance mechanisms, see id. at 7.
92 Id.
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C. Unsavory Pressure Tactics
A variety of unsavory pressure tactics have developed along with the patent
monetization mania. For example, in May of 2011, an intellectual property blog post-
ed a copy of a letter to the FBI from the owner of a Russian company, Kaspersky
Labs.93 The letter asked that the FBI file criminal charges against a mass aggregator,
RPX, for extortion, mail or wire fraud, and racketeering. According to the letter,
Kaspersky Labs and 23 other companies had been sued by a patent troll. During the
lawsuit, patent aggregator RPX emailed Kaspersky saying that it had acquired the
patents in the lawsuit. It offered to release Kaspersky from the suit in exchange for a
3-year membership in RPX at a cost of $160,000 a year.
Kaspersky asserts that in the months that followed, it received more letters
and emails from RPX, ratcheting up the pressure to join. RPX noted that other de-
fendants in the suit had joined, and that the deadline to join would soon expire. It
explained that if Kaspersky did not join, RPX would make these and other patents
from its pool available to others who had already joined RPX. Thus, if those other
RPX members were ever in a dispute against Kaspersky, they would be able to assert
the RPX patents against Kaspersky.
Finally, RPX noted that although it had pledged not to use any of its patents
offensively, it could always transfer its patents to third parties -presumably nasty,
aggressive third parties--who would use those patents to file offensive infringement
lawsuits. Of course, the only people that the nasty, aggressive third parties would be
allowed to sue would be non-RPX members, because RPX would secure a license for
all of its members before the transfer. Conveniently, most of Kaspersky's competi-
tors were already RPX members, so if Kaspersky did not join, Kaspersky would be
left holding the bag.
If the letter is accurate, who could blame the Russian company for imagining
that it was the victim of a racketeering scheme. The sad part is that these and other
types of squeeze tactics are threatening to become the norm in intellectual property
interactions in this country.
Other types of unsavory pressure tactics revolve around taking advantage of
the timing of our ever-fickle stock market. In July of 2012, for example, Yahoo settled
a patent litigation that it had filed against Facebook shortly before Facebook planned
See Patrick, Patent Aggregator RPX Accused of Extortion, Racketeering & Wire Fraud,
GAMETIME IP (May 31, 2011), http://gametimeip.com/2011/05/31/patent-aggregator-rpx-
accused-of-extortion-racketeering-wire-fraud/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2013).
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to go public.94 No money changed hands in the settlement, although the parties did
agree to expand an existing partnership, as well as to further integrate Facebook's
tools into Yahoo's content pages. News reports noted that when the lawsuit was
filed, technology commentators criticized Yahoo for behaving like a patent troll and
simply looking for a big payday.
In reporting on the settlement, the New York Times hinted broadly that Ya-
hoo had benefitted from patent suits and IPO timing in the past. The article noted
that in 2003, Yahoo purchased Overture, a search engine technology company that
had sued Google for patent infringement. 96 A year later, Google paid 2.7 million
shares of its stock, settling the case before its IPO.97
This is certainly not the only example of coordinating patent filings with
stock market timing. Other companies appear to have benefitted from patent suits
timed in conjunction with IPOs, purchase offers and other significant events. 98
The topic of questionable pressure tactics provides a perfect bridge from pa-
tents to other types of intellectual property. Although most of the article focuses on
copyrights and patents, trade secrets have their own history of unsavory pressure
tactics. A common improper use of trade secrets involves bringing a weak or even
meritless trade secret claim against a former employee or former business partner to
keep that person from competing against you. There have been a number of cases
around the country in which the trade secret plaintiff, at the end of the day, had to
pay fees and/or costs to the defendant for bringing a claim when a reasonable party
should have known that the claim could not be established. 99 Such fees are somewhat
of a deterrent, but much damage can be done long before parties get to that point,
and many parties are not be able to afford to follow a suit all the way through. In ad-
dition, the relatively low risk of having fees or costs assessed by a court may be a
small price to pay for the intimidation effect that may keep an employee from even
recognizing that the company is asserting a weak claim.
94 See Michael J. De La Merced, Yahoo and Facebook Settle Patent Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES
(ul. 6, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/06/yahoo-and-facebook-said-to-settle-
patent-lawsuits/.
95 Id.
96 See Overture Services, Inc. v Google Inc., Justia Dockets Filings (Apr. 23, 2002),
available at http://dockets.justia.com/docket/california/candce/3:2002cv01991/6770/ (last
visited Jan. 8, 2013).
97 See id.
98 Ewing, Indirect Exploitation, supra note 24; see also infra text accompanying notes 120
- 122 (describing the j2 Global antitrust allegations).
99 See, e.g., Degussa Admixtures, Inc. v. Burnett, 471 F. Supp. 2d 848 (W.D. Mich. 2007);
Digital Envoy, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 370 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (N.D. Cal. 2005); SASCO v. Rosendin
Elec., Inc., 207 Cal. App. 4th 837 (2012); HD Net LLC v. North American Boxing Council, 972
N. E. 2d 920 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012); FLIR Systems, Inc. v. Parrish, 174 Cal. App. 4th 1270 (2009).
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As described above, society might be concerned about such tactics even out-
side of large and powerful entities. Intellectual property rights holders are able to use
uncertainty, an expensive resolution process, and the possibility of out-sized reme-
dies to amplify the power of their rights. Thus, even smaller entities who might not
otherwise have power in a particular market may still be able to use their intellectual
property in ways that allow them to hide embarrassing or illegal conduct, harass
competitors, or pressure others into surrendering their rights. The ones that make it
to court, not to mention the ones that make it all the way to a judgment, are a small
sample of the entire pool.
Unsavory pressure tactics are appearing in conjunction with copyright
claims as well as patent and trade secret claims. For example, a San Francisco law
firm, has acquired copyrights to a number of pornographic movies.'00 The firm uses
digital tools such as the torrent infringement tracker at
www.youhavedownloaded.com to find people infringing the copyright. Prenda Law
then sends a letter demanding that the infringers pay a thousand dollar fine or de-
fend themselves in court.
Needless to say, a number of alleged infringers have chosen to pay quickly
and quietly, regardless of whether the accusation had any merit. One might suspect
that the accused infringers are motivated, not by potential embarrassment of an ac-
cusation of illegal downloading, but rather by the potential embarrassment of any
association with pornography.
Copyright porn trolling is appearing in a variety of forms. For example, there
are reports that mass copyright litigation against file sharing, which was pioneered
by the recording industry, is now shifting toward litigation against sharing of por-
nography, although the cases are encountering some resistance in the courts.' 0'
An odd variation on the intersection of copyright and pornography is the
website incautious.org. Incautious.org claims to have harvested "public comments"
posted on sexually-oriented websites in which users left their phone numbers and
explicit comments for performers. The comments and phone numbers are then
turned into paintings, which are offered for sale at 50 euros each. Presumably, the
1 Suits Against Individuals, PRENDA LAW INC., http://wefightpiracy.com/suits-
against-individuals.php (last visited Jan. 8, 2013); see also Megan Guess, Angry Judge Blasts Port
Trolls: "Someone Has an Awful Lot to Hide," ARS TECHNICA, Mar. 11, 2013, available at
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/03/angry-judge-blasts-porn-trolls-someone-has-an-
awful-lot-to-hide/.
101 See Timothy B. Lee, Judge Rejects Copyright Trolls' BitTorrent Conspiracy Theory, ARS
TECHNICA, Apr. 1, 2012, available at http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/04/judge-
rejects-copyright-trolls-bittorrent-conspiracy-theory/.
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primary customer for the supposed artwork would be the person wishing to prevent
publication of his or her phone number.
It is unclear whether the website is a joke, a parody, or a serious endeavor to
extract money. It could also be an effort to raise awareness about privacy, along the
lines of the website PleaseRobMe.com, which tried to alert Twitter users to the dan-
gers of telling a wide audience where they were, and by implication, that their home
was empty. Nevertheless, it is a reminder of what unscrupulous players can attempt
to do in the modern digital world.
D. Fishing for Infringers
Although not at the scale or level of complexity as patent, copyright also is
beginning to experience a variety of trolling behavior outside of the pornographic
industry.102 Consider the case of Righthaven. Righthaven was a copyright monetiza-
tion entity involving newspaper rights. Founded in 2010 by a Las Vegas attorney and
an investment banker, Righthaven partnered with newspaper companies and ac-
quired newspaper copyrights that it enforced by suing bloggers who quoted the
newspaper content on the web.'o3 Although a fair use defense might have been avail-
able, many defendants were willing to settle for a few thousand dollars rather than
risk a long and expensive litigation. Righthaven's business initially flourished, col-
lecting over $300,000.' Righthaven also collected a number of domain names and
trademarks through its settlements. Although the purpose for acquiring these is un-
clear, one might speculate that Righhaven intended to use them in further intellectual
property monetization schemes.
Righthaven's luck came to an end when its aggressive tactics attracted the at-
tention of public interest group Electronic Freedom Foundation, which stepped in to
represent some of the defendants. The monetizer's fortunes really took a turn for the
worse, however, when it began lying to a federal judge and refusing to follow court
orders. Eventually, Righthaven forfeited its assets to pay outstanding fines, and the
company's primary attorney has been barred from practicing in Federal Court, pend-
ing a Nevada Attorney Disciplinary Hearing.
102 For additional discussions of modern copyright mass litigation and trolling con-
cerns, see James DeBriyn, Shedding Light on Copyright Trolls: An Analysis of Mass Copyright Liti-
gation in the Age of Statutory Damages, 19 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 79 (2012); Tim Wu, Jay-Z Versus the
Sample Troll: The Shady One-man Corporation That's Destroying Hip-hop, SLATE (Nov. 16, 2006),
http:// www.slate.com/id/2153961/.
10 3 Ian Polonsky, You Can't Go Home Again: The Righthaven Cases and Copyright Trolling
on the Internet, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTs 71, 78 (2012).
104Id. at 80.
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Copyright trolling, however, has reached into far more respectable corners.
For example, some scientific publishers have begun suing patent attorneys for copy-
right infringement based on the fact that the attorneys must have submitted copies of
copyrighted journals as part of patent applications.'05 Patent attorneys are required
by the Patent & Trademark Office to submit physical copies of relevant articles from
academic journals. Apparently, the firms already pay for on-line access to the jour-
nals and the Patent and Trademark Office has access to most of the articles as well.
The publishers are suing on the grounds that the physical copy that was attached to
the application constitutes an infringing copy.'os
One academic journal acknowledged that its research into the infringement
activity consists of "trolling through USPTO records." 1o7 When an article of theirs is
cited, the journal checks to see if the firm has licensed more than one copy of the arti-
cle. The journal then sues those who have not, knowing that the firm will have sub-
mitted a copy to the PTO, as well as keeping a copy of the filing for itself, and that
copies of the article also reside on the firm's computers.
The US Patent Office has issued a memo arguing that copies submitted as
part of a patent application constitute fair use.'08 Nevertheless, the actions are mov-
ing forward.
Changes in technological know-how may accelerate this type of copyright
trolling. Legal Informatics, which is the study of the structure and properties of in-
formation, as well as the application to the organization, storage, retrieval, and dis-
semination of information, is poised to take off at an explosive pace in the coming
years.'09 As greater amounts of data are electronically stored, and as data mining
techniques improve, intellectual property monetizers, those pursuing both patent
and copyright claims, may find all types of approaches for exploiting the data. For
105 See Copyright: Law Firms Sued for Submitting Prior Art to the USPTO, PATENTLY-O,
Mar. 2, 2012, available at http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/03/copyright-lawfirms-
sued-for-submitting-prior-art-to-the-uspto.html; see also American Institute of Physics Wiley
Physics v. McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & Berghoff (MBHB), No. 12 C 1446, 2013 WL 505252
(N.D. Ill. 2013).
106 See id.
107 "Trolling through USPTO records" is the typical language used in a cease and de-
sist letter. See The New Choice: Inequitable Conduct or Copyright Infringement, PATENTLY-O, Jan. 23,
2012, available at http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/01/copyright-license-for-ids-
submissions.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2013).
1os See id; see also Bernard J. Knight, USPTO Position on Fair Use of Copies of NPL Made
in Patent Examination, Jan. 19, 2011, available at
http://www.uspto.gov/about/offices/ogc/USPTOPositiononFairUse-ofCopiesofNPLMadei
nPatentExamination.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2013).
1o9 Sanda Erdelez & Sheila O'Hare, Legal Informatics: Application of Information Technol-
ogy in Law, 32 ANN. REv. INFo. Sci. & TECH. 367, 367 (1997).
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example, consider all of the information that is generated publicly with any law-
suit-from depositions, to expert testimony, to exhibits. Much of that information is
in the public record. Once it can be sufficiently mined, monetization entities can sift
for evidence of innumerable types of copyright and patent claims.
In drafting this article, I strongly considered eliminating the prior paragraph.
I worry that it could provide the spark that encourages monetization entities to head
in the direction of data mining and legal informatics -making me an unwilling cata-
lyst for activities that are harmful to innovation and waste society's resources. Never-
theless, having heard a number of my students discuss the potential within this area,
I concluded that it is better to initiate the discussion and hope that courts and legisla-
tures will take advantage of the potential to move ahead of, or at least be prepared
for, the phenomenon.
E. Choosing Vulnerable Targets
Some modern monetizers have made a practice of targeting those who have
little information about the patents at issue and little ability or incentive to do any-
thing but pay up. For example, one technology blog documents a licensing campaign
brought by a company called Project Paperless."o Project Paperless sent letters to
small companies demanding license fees for using common office equipment for
scanning and emailing documents. The letter essentially told targets that if they use a
scanner or a copier with scanner capabilities to scan a document directly to an em-
ployee's email as a PDF, they are infringing Project Paperless's patents and must pay
a license fee.
The technology blog found demand letters from Project Paperless and its
successors demanding license fees that ranged from $900 to $1,200 a person. The blog
noted that the Project Paperless patents have been transferred to a network of at least
eight different shell companies, which are sending out numerous demand letters to
small businesses from New Hampshire to Minnesota.
Targeting small businesses in this way makes it unlikely that very many of
them will fight back, although the technology blog describes one target that did. In
general, a small business will know nothing about patents related to scanning. More-
IoSee Joe Mullin, Patent Trolls Want $1,000- For Using Scanners, ARS TECHNICA, Jan. 2,
2013, available at http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/01/patent-trolls-want-1000-for-
using-scanners/.
"'See id. (reproducing one of the demand letters from a successor in interest to Project
Paperless).
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over, with the average cost of a patent suit in the range of one to five million dollars,
a small business would have little choice but to pay.'l2
The Wall Street Journal reported on a similar scheme by a Chicago-based
monetizer, Innovatio IP Ventures.'1 3 Innovatio has sent 8,000 letters to restaurants,
hotels and retailers who use WiFi equipment made by companies such as Cisco. Tar-
geting customers, who are unlikely to know much about WiFi equipment and are
less likely to have the incentive to resist a demand, is more appealing than going af-
ter Cisco itself, although Cisco has tried to fight back on behalf of its customers. 114
Although choosing smaller, more vulnerable end-users may be a fruitful
method of patent assertion, choosing larger end-users may provide a method of in-
creasing one's revenue from patent assertion, as well. For example, if patent remedies
are measured in relation to the revenue from the product sold, and the settlement
value is based on the potential costs and risks of the lawsuit, larger businesses are a
better target. For example, suppose I am a small supplier of software with annual
revenues of $50 million. The potential remedy that a patent holder can obtain by su-
ing me, and thus the value of the threat, will be limited to my revenues. However,
suppose I sell my software to major brokerage houses whose total revenue is $500
million a year. The potential threat of a portion of the larger revenue may increase
the settlement value. In addition, as with unbundling patent portfolios, multiplying
the number of lawsuits multiplies the total amount of costs imposed, also increasing
the settlement return. Thus, targeting end-users can be magnify returns more effec-
tively than targeting a single manufacturer.
112 See, e.g., Matthew Sag & Kurt Rohde, Patent Reform and Differential Impact, 8 MINN.
J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 32 (2007) (citing AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW Ass'N, REPORT OF THE
ECONOMIC SURVEY 22 (2005)) (noting that an "American Intellectual Property Law Association
Economic Survey places the average cost of patent litigation at around $650,000 for a low val-
ued patent and up to $4.5 million for a higher value patent"); Richard S. Gruner, How High Is
Too High?: Reflections on the Sources and Meaning of Claim Construction Reversal Rates at the Feder-
al Circuit, 43 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 981, 1027 (2010) (citing AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW Ass'N,
REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 25 (2007)) ("The American Intellectual Property Law Associa-
tion has estimated that the average cost of preparing a patent case to the completion of the dis-
covery phase (but not through the end of the related trial) is approximately $5,000,000 for a
high-damages case.")
1 See Ashby Jones, Cisco Calls Patent Trolls Racketeers, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 11, 2012) (de-
scribing lawsuit filed by Cisco), available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324073504578113082258844080.html. But see
Jan Wolfe, Judge Tosses Cisco's RICO Claims Over NPE's Patent Licensing Campaign, AM. LAW
LITIG. DAILY (2013), available at,
http://www.americanlawyer.com/digestTAL.jsp?id=1202587118199&Judge TossesCiscos_R
ICO ClaimsoverNPEsPatentLicensingCampaign&sretum=20130106010710 (noting dis-
missal of the RICO claims while allowing the contract claims related to standard essential pa-
tents to remain).114 See id.
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A more sophisticated and interesting variation on the theme of "choosing
one's targets wisely" can be seen with the patent assertion history of j2 Global. j2
Global began as an electronic fax company, which has now expanded into cloud
storage and other services.'" 5 The company's history of assertion and acquisition is
particularly notable.
In 2006 and 2007, four sets of antitrust claims were filed against j2 Global and
its patent-holding subsidiary Catch Curve. For purposes of discussing these suits, I
will generally refer to j2 Global and its subsidiary as "j2 Global."ll 6 The antitrust alle-
gations were filed by various private parties, either as initial lawsuits or as counter-
claims in defense of patent infringement suits brought by j2 Global."'
The four antitrust suits describe activities in the market for Internet fax ser-
vices for small and home offices. In this market, companies provide their customers
with a fax number and server functions so that the customers can send and receive
fax messages directly from their computers." 8 According to the allegations, j2 Global
acquired a set of patents in 2005 that related to allowing telephone switchboard ser-
vices to store and receive faxes when the line was busy.1 9 At the time the patent ap-
plications were filed, faxing took place across telephone lines, and according to one
of the complaints, the inventors admitted that they did not conceive of faxing over
anything by telephone lines.
Once the company had acquired the patents, j2 Global began extensively as-
serting the patents against competitors in the Internet fax market through licensing
demand letters and patent infringement suits. The behaviors alleged in the antitrust
complaints are troubling. For example, one complaint alleged that j2 Global filed its
"1 For a description of j2 Global's business in 2008, see a company press release at
http://investor.j2global.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaselD=318866. For a description of its cur-
rent lines of business, including electronic faxing and cloud storage, see the company's website
at http://www.j2global.com/productOverview.
I will also use the j2 Global designation to refer to j2Global's predecessor company.
1 7 Three of the sets of the antitrust claims were filed by competitors - Venali, IDG and
Go Daddy. The fourth was filed as a class action by a customer of Internet fax services claim-
ing injury through elevated prices and reduced competition in the market. See Catch Curve,
Inc. v. Venali, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 2d 1028 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (denying motion to dismiss antitrust
counterclaims); Go Daddy Group Inc., v. j2 Global Comms., et al, No. 2:06-cv-02474-NVW
(D.C. AZ 2006) (initial action for antitrust and declaratory judgment of noninfringement); In-
tegrated Global Concepts, Inc., v. j2 Global Comms., Inc., et al No. 07CV3494 (N.D. Ill. 2007)
(initial suit alleging antitrust and other violation); Justin Lynch v. j2 Global Comms., Inc., et al,
No. CV-07-4304 DDP-(MANx) (C.D. Cal 2007) (class action).
1 8 Integrated Global Concepts, Inc., v. j2 Global, et al., supra note 117 (complaint at p.
2) [hereinafter IGC Complaint].
"1 The 2005 acquisition was made by the predecessor company to j2 Global, which is
described in this article within the "j2 Global" designation. See IGC Complaint, supra note 118
(p. 22); supra note 116 (for explanation of the collective name "j2 Global").
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patent infringement lawsuit against a competitor to coincide with the competitor's
initial public offering, in an effort to reduce the amount of capital that the competitor
would be able to raise.120 Behavior alleged in other suits included 1) disrupting a
competitor's joint venture that would have allowed the competitor to offer its prod-
uct to a hundred million users; 2) intimidating a competitor's customers by threaten-
ing to sue them; and 3) filing patent infringement lawsuits against three competitors
three weeks after the competitors objected when j2 Global tried to trademark a word
that they believed was generic; and 4) refusing to lower the licensing price when a
licensing target would only license part of the portfolio (in other words saying, you
can license fewer of our patents, but it will cost you the same price).' 2 ' All four of the
suits alleged a pattern of aggressive behavior, unsupportable patent interpretations,
and intimidation aimed at a broad array of competitors.122
The factual record is limited in the j2 Global antitrust cases. Of the four sets
of antitrust claims, only Venali has proceeded as far as summary judgment, where it
was dismissed for failure to overcome the stringent immunity from antitrust liability
120 See Go Daddy Group Inc., v. j2 Global Comms., et al, No. 2:06-cv-02474-NVW (D.C.
AZ 2006) 1Complaint filed Oct 17, 2006 at p. 14).
See Catch Curve, Inc. v. Venali, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 2d 1028 (C.D. CA 2007); Integrat-
ed Global Concepts, Inc., v. j2 Global Comms., Inc., et al No. 07CV3494 (N.D. Ill 2007) (com-
plaint filed Oct 17, 2006 at p. 28) (allegations related to trademark dispute); Go Daddy Group
Inc., v. j2 Global Comms., et al, No. 2:06-cv-02474-NVW (D.C. AZ 2006) (complaint filed Oct.
17, 2006 at p. 14-15) (describing joint venture disruption and customer threats in relation to
Venali); ); Justin Lynch v. j2 Global Comms., Inc., et al, No. CV-07-4304 DDP-(MANx) (C.D.
CA 2007) (complaint filed Aug. 1, 2007 at p. 13) (describing issues regarding pricing of whole
or part of patents in relation to Venali).
I Venalilnc's Amended Counterclaim at 4, Catch Curve, Inc. v. Venali, Inc., 519 F.
Supp. 2d 1028 (C.D. CA 2007) (No. CV 05-4820 DDP AJW) ("j2 has caused multiple objectively
baseless lawsuits to be filed against its competitors to force them to spend precious time, ener-
gy and money in order to defend themselves. In the process of waging these bad faith and an-
ticompetitive lawsuits, j2 and Catch Curve intimidate and harass the customers of j2's com-
petitors by notifying them of the patent lawsuits and, in some cases, threatening to include the
customers in the lawsuits."); Complaint at 3-4, Integrated Global Concepts, Inc., v. j2 Global
Comms., Inc., et al, 2007 WL 1849948 (N.D. Ill 2007) (No. 07CV3494 ) ("j2 and other defendants
have within the past four years waged a fraudulent and vicious campaign to intimidate pro-
viders of Internet facsimile services into paying money to j2 and/or Catch Curve for licenses of
patents that the defendants know do not cover the competitors' activities but to achieve a set-
tlement which costs less than litigating the issues."); Complaint at 2-3, Go Daddy Group Inc.,
v. j2 Global Comms., et al, 2006 WL 5125608 (D.C. AZ 2006) (No. 2:06-cv-02474-NVW) ("j2 has
sought to remain the dominant provider not by offering a better, more attractive service at a
competitive price, but by waging a campaign of acquisition, intimidation, and litigation de-
signed to raise its rivals' costs or prevent them from offering competitive services altogether...
j2 and Catch Curve have waged a vicious campaign to intimidate providers of internet facsimi-
le servicses to pay j2 and Catch Curve for licenses to groups of patents that do not cover the
competitors' activities."); Justin Lynch v. j2 Global Comms., Inc., et al, No. CV-07-4304 DDP-
(MANx) (C.D. CA 2007).
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that exists for filing lawsuits.123 However, working from j2Global's own filings and
press releases, as well as the few published decisions in the cases, the following in-
formation emerges.
First, j2 Global has sued a striking number of its competitors, and many, alt-
hough not all, of the lawsuits were against relatively small competitors.124 J2 Global
argues that most of the companies offering Internet fax services have modest reve-
nues, which limits the potential damages and makes it economically sensible for the
parties to settle for relatively small amounts.125 Nevertheless, suing small companies
has the happy coincidence of ensuring that most will be unable to fight back, given
that patent litigation can cost 1-5 million dollars.126 For a small revenue company, it is
difficult to justify that type of expenditure -and even more difficult to find a patent
litigator willing to take your case.' 27
In addition to its wide-ranging assertion campaign, j2 Global also has had a
remarkably large appetite for acquiring competitors and related companies, both
here and abroad. A quick search of press reports as well as j2 Global's releases shows
j2 Global acquiring more than 20 companies, including acquisitions in Canada, the
UK, Ireland, Europe, Hong Kong, and Australia.128 Some of the companies acquired
123See infra text accompanying notes 171-183 (describing immunity from antitrust lia-
bility for ptitioning the government).
See, e.g., j2 Global, Inc. v. Integrated Global Concepts, Inc., No. CV 12-03439 DDP,
2012 WL 1551356 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2012); j2 Global Commc'ns Inc. v. Captaris Inc., No. CV
09-04150 DDP, 2009 WL 4615851 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2009) (Captaris and Open Tex Corp.
named as defendants); j2 Global Commc'ns Inc. v. Protus IP Solutions Inc., No. CV 09-04146
(C.D. Cal. June 11, 2009); MXGO Technologies Incvs 1 & 1 Mail & Media Inc., No. CV 11-00413
(E.D. Tex. Sept. 15, 2011) (GoDaddy named as a defendant); j2 Global Commc'ns Inc. v.
EasyTel.Net, No. CV 05-05785 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2005).
125 See Catch Curve, Inc. v. Venali, Inc., 2008 WL 5152076 (C.D. Cal.) (Catch Curve,
Inc. and j2 Global Comms, Inc.'s Reply Memo. of Points & Authorities in Support of Their Mo-
tion for Partial Summary Judgment, September 30, 2008 at pp 15-16).
127 See, e.g., Sag & Rohde, supra note 112; Gruner, supra note 112.One could speculate, although it would be purely speculation, that the company
tried going after larger targets, found it too difficult to get anything out of them, and along the
way, learned that going after smaller entities was much more effective.
128 See Venali, http://www.linkedin.com/company/venali (last visited Mar. 23,
2013); j2 Global Acquires Australia-Based Zintel Communications, j2 Global,
http://investor.j2global.com/releasedetailRLR.cfm?ReleaselD=653072 (last visited Mar. 23,
2013); j2 Global Acquires Cloud-Based CRM Provider Landslide Technologies, Inc., j2 Global
(Feb. 6, 2012), http://investor.j2global.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=646253; j2 Global Ac-
quires Zimo Communications Ltd. and Its NumberstoreTM Cloud Voice Service, j2 Global (Feb.
16, 2012), http://investor.j2global.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=649119; j2 Global Acquires
Offsite Backup Solutions, LLC, j2 Global (Jan. 23, 2012),
http://investor.j2global.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=641499; j2 Global Acquires Data Ha-
ven Limited, j2 Global (July 11, 2011),
http://investor.j2global.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=590305; j2 Global Inc (JCOM.OQ),
http://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/companyOfficers?symbol=JCOM.OQ (last visited
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were ones that J2 Global had previously sued for patent infringement,129 raising the
question of whether the lawsuits and patent assertions could have played a role in
reducing the price, distracting management, or otherwise disadvantaging a target
prior to purchase. In particular, j2 Global has been able to acquire some of the com-
panies that have created the greatest headaches for them, including two of the three
companies that purportedly objected to j2 Global's trademark filing as well as Venali.
(Venali had filed antitrust claims,130 which were dismissed on summary judgment,
and was eventually successful in proving that j2 Global's [AudioFax] patents related
only to telephone fax systems and not to Venali's Internet fax services.)'"' The indi-
Mar. 23, 2013) (j2 Global acquires eFax); j2 Global Acquires UK Voice Provider, Alban Telecom
Limited, j2 Global (July 26, 2010),
http://investor.j2global.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaselD=491961; j2 Global Communications,
Inc. Acquires keeplTsafe, j2 Global (Oct. 21, 2010),
http://investor.j2global.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaselD=521177; j2 Global Acquires Unified
Messaging and Communications Business of mBox Pty, Ltd., j2 Global (Apr. 1, 2010),
http://investor.j2global.com/releasedetailcfm?ReleaselD=456271; j2 Global Acquires Phone
People Holdings Corporation, j2 Global (May 15, 2008),
http://investor.j2global.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaselD=310517; j2 Global Acquires Onebox
Unified Communications Assets From Call Sciences, j2 Global (Aug. 9, 2004),
http://investor.j2global.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaselD=197185; j2 Global Acquires
RapidFax Business from Easylink Services International, j2 Global (Dec. 13, 2007),
http://investor.j2global.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaselD=281668; j2 Global Acquires Digital
Faxing Business of Mediaburst Limited, j2 Global (June 4, 2008),
http://investor.j2global.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaselD=313749; j2 Global Acquires
MailWise and Mijanda, j2 Global (Dec. 1, 2008),
http://investor.j2global.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaselD=351115; j2 Global Acquires YAC
Limited, j2 Global (July 19, 2007),
http://investor.j2global.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaselD=255199; j2 Global Acquires Data On
Call Assets, j2 Global (July 6, 2005),
http://investor.j2global.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaselD=197161; j2 Global Acquires
CallWave Internet Fax Assets, j2 Global (Feb. 25, 2009),
http://investor.j2global.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaselD=197161;j2 Global Communications
To Acquire The Electric Mail Company, Global Growth Partners,
http://www.globalgrowthpartners.com/pdf/j2_GlobalCommunications-ToAcquireThe-E
lectric MailCompany.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2013); j2 Global,
http://www.answers.com/topic/j2-global-communications (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (j2
Global acI uires Cyberbox of Hong Kong, M4Internet, and Unifax).
9 See j2 Global Commc'ns Inc. v. Venali Inc., No. CV 04-01172 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 20,
2004); j2 Global Commc'ns Inc. v. EasyLinkServs. Int'l Corp., No. CV 08-00263 (E.D. Tex. June
26, 2008); *2 Global Commc'ns Inc. v. Mijanda Inc., No. CV 05-05300 (C.D. Cal. July 21, 2005).
o According to assertions in another antitrust case, Venali had argued among other
things that j2Global's initial patent assertions represented a veiled acquisition attempt. See Jus-
tin Lynch v. j2 Global Comms., Inc., et al, No. CV-07-4304 DDP-(MANx) (C.D. Cal. 2007)
(complaint filed June 29, 2007 at p. 12 ).
1 For the non-precedential Federal Circuit opinion upholding the district court's
summary judgment of non-infringement, see Catch Curve, Inc. v. Venali, Inc., 363 F. App'x 19
(Fed. Cir. 2010).
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vidual company acquisitions, as well as other asset acquisitions, do not appear to
have been significant enough to trigger FTC or DOJ reporting requirements.
A fascinating point in the lawsuits concerns the varying interpretations of
some of j2 Global's key patents. Prior to acquiring the telephone switchboard patents,
j2 Global was sued by the former owner of those patents. In that litigation, j2 Global
denied that the telephone switchboard patents could apply to Internet faxing,' 32
which uses entirely different technology and has no issues about needing to store in-
formation because the fax line is busy. After settling that lawsuit, j2Global acquired
the telephone switchboard patents and began asserting them against competitors on
the theory that the patents did, indeed, apply to Internet faxing.
As j2 Global points out in one of its briefs, when one is sued by a patent
holder, it is standard practice to deny that the patent applies to one's product.133
Nevertheless, some court decisions have agreed that the telephone switchboard pa-
tents do not apply to Internet faxing. For example, the Federal Circuit in the Venali
case agreed with the district court that "for a machine to be a 'fax' machine that
sends 'fax' messages, it must use a certain protocol . . . . Otherwise, nothing distin-
guishes these machines from any other machine used for communication." 134
The broad reach asserted with the telephone switchboard patents is trou-
bling, as is the type of patent. I have written about such method patent before, in
which broad prose language is used to describe the invention, without describing the
particular way in which the inventor has solved the problem or limiting what the in-
ventor is claiming as territory.' 35
For example, one of the claims says little more than "a method of delivering
a facsimile image" that involves assigning phone numbers on a telephone switch-
board to intended recipients, "answering at the call handling facility the received tel-
ephone call and interacting using the facsimile protocol" and "directing the fax mes-
sage to one of the destinations selected from the group consisting of (i) a mailbox. . .
and (ii) a fax receiving device." 3 6 This type of language is standard in certain patent
areas, and its broad, nonspecific wording can provide extraordinary reach without
much of a knowledge contribution.
132 See Catch Curve, Inc. v. Venali, Inc., supra note 125 (brief at p. 13).
1 See id.
134 See Catch Curve, Inc. v. Venali, Inc., 363 F. App'x 19, 22 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
135 See FELDMAN, supra note 19, at 111-13, 130-35. Mark Lemley refers to this as "func-
tional claiming." Mark Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming 7 (Stan-
ford Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 2117302, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2117302.
See Catch Curve, Inc. v. Venali, Inc., 363 F. App'x 19, 22 (Fed. Cir. 2010), at 3-4 (re-
producing one of the claims).
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As described above, the district court in Venali dismissed Venali's antitrust
claims against j2 Global on summary judgment, ruling that Venali could not over-
come the stringent immunity from antitrust liability that exists for filing lawsuits.
One part of the summary judgment decision is particularly striking. The court felt
that although prior suits were not resolved by a court or jury on the merits and no
prior court had construed any of the patent claims, the fact that prior cases had end-
ed in settlements should be considered "litigation success."' 3 7 The court reasoned
that because patent owners seek an injunction or damages through an infringement
suit, the fact that defendants paid licensing fees reflected a successful case.
The problem with this logic is the feedback loop it creates.'3 8 In the modern
world of patent monetization, an aggressive and well-financed patent holder can
pressure smaller or less sophisticated targets into settling, simply because the costs of
litigation are too burdensome. By choosing one's targets wisely, a savvy monetizer
can target vulnerable plaintiffs early on and establish a string of settlments, which
can then be used to convince other targets to settle and to convince a court that the
entire campaign had merit to begin with.
As for j2 Global, the company appears to have moved on to additional patent
portfolios and new horizons. A press report indicates that j2 Global has joined forces
with the large patent aggregator, Acacia. 139 According to the report, j2 Global and
another company have granted an exclusive license for a set of patents to an Acacia
subsidiary, Unified Messaging. The Acacia subsidiary has sued about 100 compa-
nies, including Google, Facebook, Twitter, HomeAway and Etsy. Other large enti-
ties, such as Travelocity, T-Moblie, Reliant Energy and Bank of America reportedly
have already settled with the subsidiary.140
137 See Catch Curve, Inc., v. Venali, Inc., (D.C. CA.) Case No CV 05-04820 DDP AJWx
(filed Nov. 3, 2008) at 18; see also In Re Terazosin, 335 F. Supp. 2d 1336,1358 n. 13 (noting that
"'[Tihe court cannot agree with Plaintiffs that a plaintiff who has filed suit and receives the re-
lief sought (e.g., monetary compensation, a change in conduct, etc.) could only have been
deemed to have 'won' under PRE if it continued to litigate the case and received a favorable
judgment from the court").
138 Cf James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116
YALE L.J. 882, 882 (2007)(arguing that "[sleeking a license where none is needed is problematic
because "the existence (vel non) of licensing markets plays a key role in determining the
breadth of rights, [so] these . .. decisions eventually feed back into doctrine, as the licensing
itself becomes proof that the entitlement covers the use").
3 Information in this paragraph was reported in Vicky Garza, Patent troll targets
Home Away, Austin Business Journal (July 6, 2012), available at
http://www.bizjournals.com/austin/print-edition/2012/07/06/successful-patent-troll-
targets-homeaway.html?page=all.
140 See id.
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As noted, it is difficult to know the facts of j2 Global, but the available infor-
mation indicates the potential for a lucrative and troubling strategy that could be
adopted under the current legal regime. Acquire broadly worded patents from a pri-
or era. Choose an emerging market or submarket characterized by smaller players.
Assert those patents aggressively using broad interpretations in a way that weakens
competition and makes competitors ripe for acquisitions. Ensure that the size of the
competitors will make it difficult for them to fight back effectively and for antitrust
regulators to focus on any acquisition of a company or portfolio. (In the spirit of
modern patenting, I suppose I should patent the description in the paragraph above
as a "method of doing business," although it might be obvious in light of prior art -
among other problems.)
F. Walking to the Edge of the Line
Several of the examples listed above describe practices in which intellectual
property rights holders intimidate potential targets by suggesting, tacitly or explicit-
ly, that they are entitled to rights beyond what they actually have under the law. The
following is a similar example from copyright, and it is one that embodies other
questionable tactics as well.
The example relates to cognitive testing in medical examinations. 141 For dec-
ades, the standard approach for testing a patient's mental status has been to use the
Mini-Mental State Examination. The examination is a brief set of questions and chal-
lenges to pose for a patient, including "who is the president of the United States" and
"count backwards from 100 by sevens." It covers basic math, language and motor
skills. The Mini-Mental State Exam was first published in a scholarly journal written
by Marshal Folstein, Susan Folstein, and Paul McHugh in 1975. 142
Part of the value of the test lies in the fact that it has been so widely used.
Vast numbers of studies have been conducted with it, a fact that ensures easier cross-
referencing and comparison of research data. Medical students can recite it in their
sleep. Medical professionals can compare a single patient across many years and
141 For a more detailed discussion of the current controversy surrounding the Mini-
Mental State Exam and the legal validity of the copyright claims, see Robin Feldman & John
Newman, Copyright at the Bedside: Should We Stop The Spread?, STAN. TECH. L. REv (forthcoming
2013). See also John Newman & Robin Feldman, Copyright and Open Access at the Bedside, 365
NEw ENG. J.MED. 2449 (Dec. 29, 2011) (describing the problem and encouraging the creation of
a cultural norm in the field of medicine, in which medical researchers ensure continued avail-
ability of their tests through open source licensing for any copyrights that might exist).
142 See Marshal F. Folstein, Susan Folstein& Paul R. McHugh, "Mini-mental state": A
practical method for grading the cognitive state of patients for the clinician, 12 J. PSYCHOL. REs. 189,
189-98 (1975).
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many different hospitals and clinical settings because all of the institutions are likely
to have used the same test.
All of this began to change in 2000. After decades of widespread use, the au-
thors of the Mini-Mental State Exam created a monetization structure in which an en-
tity named Psychological Assessment Resources (PAR) began asserting copyright
against hospitals and physicians. 143 In the wake of PAR's assertion tactics, the Mini-
Mental State Exam has disappeared from the latest editions of medical textbooks,
pocket guides and clinical toolkits.'" PAR is not alone in asserting copyright in med-
ical tests, and the phenomenon is spreading in the health care field.
A variety of legal arguments could be made to undermine PAR's assertion of
copyright.145 Hospitals and physicians, however, have been loath to enter a legal bat-
tle that would be long, expensive and offers an uncertain outcome. More threatening
than monetary damages is the possibility of criminal liability. No matter how rare or
unlikely to apply under these circumstances, physicians in particular are spooked by
even the slightest and most remote possibility of a criminal charge.
A busy hospital wishing to switch away from using the popular test would
have to ensure that no one made a single copy of it-not for a training manual, re-
minder card, the hospital's website, or to download on any individual computer an-
ywhere in the hospital. And what about if a medical professional in the hospital ad-
ministered the test, asking the questions one by one? Would that constitute making a
copy of the test?
Perhaps the claim with the weakest legal grounding would be any copyright
claim based on administering the test verbally to a patient. Copyright covers a varie-
ty of ways one might make a copy of a creative work, but what kind of copy could
this be? There is no written copy, no videotape, no other recording. The only possible
approach would be to argue that using the test is analogous to producing a play or a
song. When a physician administers the test, he or she is "performing the work." 46
Describing the claim in this manner, however, highlights one of the problems
with copyright claims for medical testing at all. To the extent that one is claiming to
control the test itself, rather than some description explaining the circumstances for
using the test or what to do with particular results, one is actually trying to claim a
process. Copyright specifically does not cover processes and methods.147 Thus, claim-
143 For a description of the monetization structure, see Feldman & Newman, supra
note 141, at 4.
144 Id.
145For a detailed discussion of the validity of the legal claims, see id.
146 See id.
147 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) provides: "In no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, con-
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ing copyright in this type of medical test is really a backdoor method for trying to get
a patent without meeting the rigorous requirements for patentability.148
PAR's licensing approach comes as close as possible to the line of requiring
license fees for administration of the test, without actually specifying it. In fact, one
could be forgiven for assuming that PAR is licensing each administration of the test,
given the crafty language used.
For example, PAR's licensing policy,14 9 which is available on its website, re-
peatedly refers to "using" the test or "use" of the test. Purchasers are instructed to
purchase the number of test protocols needed for their intended purposes. In addi-
tion, the website specifies that one must purchase a test manual in addition to pur-
chasing the test, if one plans to use all or part of the test. Most important, PAR will
calculate fees due only after interested parties have submitted a permission request.
Among many other things, the permission request form asks how many people you
will be testing and if you are using this for clinical purposes--in other words, if you
are treating patients. 50 Given this licensing approach, it seems likely that PAR's fee
calculations are based, at least in part, on how many times one will administer the
test orally to a patient. The language on the website would certainly lead many peo-
ple to think that payment per administration of the test is required.
Other troubling aspects include the timing of the rights assertion. In this
case, the authors of the test allowed the public to use the test freely and openly for
decades. Intellectual Property rights were only asserted after the test had become ful-
ly entrenched in the medical landscape.' 5 '
One might also note that creating a monetization entity has benefits in addi-
tion to protecting the authors from liability and ease of administration. Creating a
separate entity insulates the scholars to some extent from the bad publicity of the
monetization entity, leaving the sense that is just big, bad PAR making us all pay.
cept, principal, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illus-
trated, or embodied in such work."
148 See id.
149 Permissions & Licensing, PAR, http://www4.parinc.com/ProRes/permissions.aspx
(last visited Jan. 8, 2013).
150 See Permission Request Form, PAR,
http://www4.parinc.com/webuploads/permission-request/PermissionReqjorm-distribut
ed.pdf (last viewed Jan. 8, 2013). The form does also ask how the test will be administered and
gives paper/pencil and online/Internet as examples. Thus, PAR could possibly argue that
they would only charge for those administrations that involve a full, written copy of the test.
The question does not ask for a breakdown, however, between administration orally and ad-
ministration through written copy, making it unlikely that PAR is differentiating in this way.
151 For an argument that investment and value creation in the development of de fac-
to standards in this case should weigh against copyright protection, see Feldman & Newman,
supra note 141.
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Finally, the Mini-Mental State Exam provides another example of integrating
different intellectual property regimes. In the "frequently asked questions" section of
the website, PAR explains that under trade secret law, those who use the test are not
permitted to release the results of the test to those who are not qualified to review
and interpret them.15 2 The materials go on to explain that usefulness and validity
would be compromised if the materials became available to the general public.
One can certainly understand the authors' concerns that if patients know the
various questions and answers by heart, the test will be far less useful for evaluating
mental state.15 3 Nevertheless, PAR's statement that "PAR's instruments are trade se-
crets" is somewhat odd. The secrecy requirement in trade secrecy generally measures
whether the information gives the owner an advantage over others competitors who
do not know it.154 The fact that patients might not know the test is irrelevant to the
inquiry. The appropriate question is whether the test itself is well known by competi-
tors in the medical field. Given how widely the test is known, one might argue that it
could not possibly constitute a secret, at least not in the way that secrecy is ordinarily
measured for the purposes of trade secret.
Moreover, limiting the release of test data might have other advantages for
PAR unrelated to the need to keep patients from being able to "psych out" the test. If
results cannot be released without PARs permission to anyone who is not medically
trained, then medical researchers cannot publish their results in medical journals,
which are generally available to any member of the public willing to subscribe to
them or to pay an access fee. In theory, PAR could demand a payment for a license to
release the data or could insist that all data must be released through its own publica-
tion service, which could charge an access fee. This could provide an additional are-
na for revenue generation, although one that could have negative implications for the
free flow of scientific data.
A reminder of the relationship between different intellectual property re-
gimes provides a good conclusion for this section. As mentioned above, the fluidity
among the different intellectual property regimes suggests that any attempt to cabin
inappropriate behaviors should encompass all intellectual property regimes. Perhaps
the best example of the problem comes from a recent email I received from a practi-
tioner who serves as in-house counsel at a technology company. The company had
been paying royalties to use a particular patent. Shortly before the patent was sched-
152Frequently Asked Questions, PAR, http://www4.parinc.com/Faqs.aspx (last visited
Jan. 8, 2013).
1
5 This, of course, is an unavoidable problem for administering the test to medical
professionals themselves.
154Morlife, Inc. v. Perry, 66 Cal Rptr. 2d 731 (Cal. App.1997); see also Am. Paper &
Packaging Products, Inc. v. Kirgan, 228 Cal. Rptr. 713 (Cal. App. 2d 1986).
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uled to expire, the company received a proposed contract from the patent holder for
licensing of trademark rights. The trademark contract was absolutely identical to the
patent contract, listing the same property, the same uses, and the same conditions.
The sole difference between the two documents was that the word "patent" had been
replaced throughout by the word "trademark."15
IV. Current Tools are Inadequate
The legal system does have a variety of tools that could be used to address
various aspects of the problem of the inappropriate use of intellectual property. Each
of the tools, however, is ill suited for the task at hand.
A. Tools Within Intellectual Property
The intellectual property system itself has tools that, in theory, might address
inappropriate use. These include patent misuse, copyright misuse, and the doctrine
of inequitable conduct before the Patent Office, each of which will be discussed be-
low.
Patent misuse traditionally has been defined as an impermissible attempt to
expand the time or scope of the patent. Since 1992, the Federal Circuit also has re-
quired that the attempted expansion must have "anticompetitive effect."56
Patent misuse, however, has many drawbacks as a solution to the types of
problems described above. It is an affirmative defense only and cannot be raised in
circumstances other than to defend against a claim of infringement. In addition, the
sole remedy available for patent misuse is a draconian one. If a patent holder is
found to have misused a patent, the patent becomes unenforceable against anyone,
until the effects of the misuse have dissipated. To my knowledge, no court has ever
had the opportunity to interpret what it means for the effects to have dissipated.
Perhaps because of the draconian nature of the remedy, the Federal Circuit
simply refuses to apply patent misuse. One would have to search quite vigorously to
155 For purely anecdotal purposes, I note that recent PLI programs in 2012 and 2013
included a number of segments on copyright and trademark monetization. See IP Monetization
2012: Maximizing the Value of Your IP Assets, PRACISING LAW INSITUTE (May 10, 2012),
http://www.pli.edu/Content/OnDemand/IPMonetization2012 MaximizetheValue-of/
/N-4nZ1zl330y?fromsearch=false&ID=142947.
For a detailed history of Patent Misuse and variations between the Federal Circuit
interpretation and prior precedent, see Robin Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for
Patent Misuse, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 399, 415-31 (2003).
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find any judgment of patent misuse that the Federal Circuit has upheld in its 30-year
history.
Copyright has its own misuse doctrine, but it is not much more robust than
patent misuse. The doctrine was not used successfully until the 1990 Lasercomb
case.'5 7 Since that time, copyright misuse has been used only sporadically, with most
of the cases taking place in the 1990s and in the context of software.'5 1
One of the few, and most interesting, discussions of the doctrine of copyright
misuse in the twenty-first century appears in the Seventh Circuit's 2003
WIREdataopinion, written by Judge Posner.'5 9 Commenting on the doctrine of copy-
right misuse, Judge Posner noted the following: "hoping to force a settlement or even
achieve an outright victory over an opponent that may lack the resources or the legal
sophistication to resist effectively, is an abuse of process."160 Other courts, however,
have not taken up the analysis offered by Judge Posner.
Patent law also has a doctrine of inequitable conduct before the Patent Office.
After a less than stellar history, in which the defense appeared almost de rigeurin all
cases, and the doctrine's primary use appeared to be in bashing one's opponent,
Congress severely curtailed the doctrine in 2011.61 To some extent, the Federal Cir-
cuit had already beaten them to the punch, significantly limiting the doctrine in the
en banc Therasense case earlier that year.162
15 7Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 972 (4th Cir. 1990); Kathryn
Judge, Note, Rethinking Copyright Misuse, 57 STAN. L. REv. 901, 902 (2004).
158 For extended analysis of copyright misuse, see Neal Hartzog, Gaining Momentum:
A Review of Recent Developments Surrounding the Expansion of the CopyrightMisuse Doctrine and
Analysis of the Doctrine in its Current Form, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 371 (2004); Brett
Frischmann, The Evolving Common Law Doctrine of Copyright Misuse, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 865
(2000); Judge, supra note 157; see also 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 13.09[A] (2003)(noting that Lasercomb remains the exceptional case).
159See Assessment Tech. of WI, LLC, v. WIRE data, 350 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2003).
"oSee id. at 647.
16 35 U.S.C. § 282(a)(3) provides that the failure to disclose the best mode shall no
longer be a basis, in patent validity or infringement proceedings, on which any claim of a pa-
tent may be cancelled or held invalid or otherwise unenforceable. Other major changes in the
AIA include moving to a first-to-file system from first-to-invent. In addition, prior user rights
can now act as a defense to infringement liability. For discussion of problems with Inequitable
conduct prior to 2011, see Christian E. Mammen, Controlling the "Plague": Reforming the Doc-
trine of Inequitable Conduct, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1329 (2009); see also Robin Feldman, The Role
of the Subconscious in Intellectual Property Law, 2 HASTINGS SC. & TECH. L.J. 2 (2010).
162 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson &Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed.Cir. 2011) (citing
Mammen, supra notel6l).
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B. Tools Outside of Intellectual Property
Other legal tools, outside of intellectual property law, conceivably could be
pressed into service to address inappropriate uses -particularly if they were adjust-
ed. Even in combination, however, these doctrines would leave much of the modern
behavior unaddressed.
1. Laches & Implied Contract
The equitable doctrine of laches might be available in response to certain
forms of questionable behavior, particularly in copyright. In a claim for patent in-
fringement, laches is an equitable defense that the patentee did not enforce its patent
rights in a timely manner. 163 As Learned Hand noted in 1916, "it is inequitable for the
owner of a copyright, with full notice of an intended infringement, to stand inactive
... and to intervene only when his speculation has proved a success." 6
The Fourth Circuit, however, has held that equitable rules such as laches,
which are concerned with time delays, cannot be applied to bar claims for which a
statute has dictated the prescribed time period for enforcement of rights. In other
words, if Congress has decided that copyright holders may enforce their rights for
the life of the author plus 70 years, courts cannot decide that any claims brought
within that stated period are untimely.1 6 5
In a decision promulgated the same year as the Fourth Circuit's opinion,
however, the Ninth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion. The copyright holder
had failed for 36 years to complain of the defendant's exploitation of the James Bond
character, and the Ninth Circuit found that laches barred the suit.166 The Supreme
Court has yet to speak on the issue, however, and the status of the doctrine in these
circumstances remains unclear.
The doctrine of implied contract also might be available as a defense in cer-
tain cases of copyright trolling behavior. For example, in 2006, a federal district court
in Nevada ruled in the Field v. Google case that a website could not sue Google for
BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 953 (9th ed. 2009) (defining laches as, "[u]nreasonable de-
lay in pursuing a right or claim . . . in a way that prejudices the party against whom relief is
sought.").6
Haas v. Leo Feist, 234 F. 105, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1916); see also Universal Pictures Co. v.
Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1947); Blackburn v. Southern Cal. Gas Co., 14 F.
Supp. 55 S.D. Cal. 1936).
1See Lyons Partnership v.Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 797 (4th Cir. 2001).See Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2001); see also NIMMER, supra
note 158, at § 12.06[1].
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copyright infringement stemming from the fact that Google caches 67 the website as
part of its search engine function.'6 8 The court cited a Southern District of New York
opinion finding that a copyright owner's knowledge of the accused infringer's ac-
tions coupled with the owner's silence constituted an implied license.'6 9 Field v.
Google, however, expands the doctrine of implied license well beyond any decisions
the relevant circuit court has made in this area. In finding implied copyright license,
the Ninth Circuit generally has relied on facts involving a prior relationship between
the parties and the implications of the interactions of the parties. It is unclear whether
the Field approach will be upheld in the Ninth circuit, or other circuits. It is also pos-
sible that the broad nature of the doctrine could create as many problems as it
solves.170
2. Antitrust and Sham Litigation
One might imagine that the answer to many of the modern intellectual prop-
erty shenanigans would lie in the notion of preventing parties from abusing the court
system. After all, the heart of at least some of these schemes involves threatening or
bringing less than meritorious lawsuits to damage or harass competitors. Antitrust
actions based on abusive use of the legal system, however, are unlikely to provide a
fruitful path unless the Supreme Court is willing to significantly adjust the legal
precedents in this arena. '7
The problem begins with the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which protects the
rights of citizens to petition the government without fear of antitrust liability. 72 The
doctrine originally developed to protect attempts to persuade the legislative branch
to adopt a law, or the executive branch to enforce a law, in a way that would have an
anticompetitive effect.'7 3 Over time, the doctrine has expanded to protect the right to
petition the courts.' 74
167 When Google makes and analyzes a copy of each webpage that it finds, and then
stores the code in a temporary repository one describes this as "caching" the page.
168 Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F.Supp.2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006).
169 See Keane Dealer Servs., Inc. v. Harts, 968 F.Supp. 944, 947 (S.D.N.Y.1997).
170 See Liam Knepprath-Malone, Examining the Dichotomy in Implied License Law in
the Ninth Circuit (2012) (unpublished manuscript)(on file with author) (arguing, among other
things that applying Field outside of the internet arena would be problematic).
171 See FELDMAN, supra note 19, at 166-69 (providing a detailed description of problems
with the doctrines in sham litigation and antitrust as they intersect with patent law).
172 Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961). 13 See id.; see also United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
174 See Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 510 (1972).
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There is an exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine for sham litigations.
The sham litigation doctrine attempts to prevent parties from using the governmen-
tal process itself as an anticompetitive weapon.'75 The problem for intellectual prop-
erty cases involves the elements that must be established to demonstrate sham litiga-
tion. Specifically, in the 1993 Professional Real Estate case, the Supreme Court held that
in order to show that legal actions constitute sham litigation, those actions must be
both 1) objectively baseless, in the sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically
expect success on the merits, and 2) subjectively baseless such that the lawsuit con-
ceals an attempt to use administrative or judicial processes to interfere with a com-
petitor.176
A court is allowed to examine the subjective portion of the evidence only if
the court first concludes that no reasonable litigant could have expected to suc-
ceed.177 Given the uncertainties in intellectual property law, litigants can almost al-
ways establish some possibility that one might succeed -at least enough to avoid a
finding that the filing was entirely baseless.
A few courts have suggested that different approaches may be available
when parties file a multiplicity of lawsuits. 78 In some cases, the number of suits cou-
pled with other evidence may suggest a potential abuse of the legal process. In addi-
tion, for many patent assertion lawsuits, the goal is not the outcome of the litigation;
rather, the goal is to impose the costs of the litigation process on the product compa-
ny. Putting the two notions together, a multiplicity of suits or other types of patent
assertion behavior could indicate that a patent holder is motivated by something
other than the outcome of the lawsuits. This type of result should be antithetical to
See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, 499 U.S. 380 (1991).
176 See Prof'l Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 60-
61(1993); see also id.at 58 (characterizing the Cal. Motor Transport Court's discussion of the diffi-
culty in evaluating whether a claim is baseless as endorsing an objective standard); Cal. Motor
Transp. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. at 513.
177 See Prof'1 Real Estate v. Columbia, 508 U.S. at 60 ("First, the lawsuit must be objec-
tively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the
merits.").
s78 See USS-POSCO Indus. v. Contra Costa County Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 31
F.3d 810-811 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Cal. Motor Transport. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508);
see also See Primetime 24 Joint Venture v. NBC, 219 F.3d 100-101 (2d Cir. 2000); Livingston
Downs Racing Ass'n v. Jefferson Downs Corp., 192 F. Supp. 2d 538-539 (M.D. La. 2001); cf.
Ernest v. Hahn, Inc., v. Codding, 615 F. 2d 830 (9th Cir. 1980). The Ninth Circuit hedged its bets
more recently, however, in the 2009 case of Kaiser v. Abbott Labs. See Kaiser Found. Health Plan
Inc. v. Abbott Labs. Inc., 552 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 2009). In addition, the Federal Circuit has sig-
naled that it does not agree with the Ninth Circuit's approach. See Nobelpharma AB v. Implant
Innovations, 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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proper use of the legal system, and could form the basis of a method of establishing
sham litigation. For such an approach to be successful, however, courts would have
to be willing to allow the doctrine of sham litigation to evolve in light of the modem
realities of patent assertion.
Even without the sham litigation doctrine, however, antitrust may provide
other avenues. Private or public antitrust authorities may be able to bring actions
based on anticompetitive actions other than filing lawsuits. Effective antitrust en-
forcement in this area will require a shift in the way that we define relevant mar-
kets. 17 For example, antitrust authorities examine three different kinds of markets -
markets for goods, technology markets, and innovation markets.o8 0 In examining
markets for goods, authorities will consider the particular goods and their substi-
tutes. Technology markets relate to circumstances in which intellectual property is
marketed separate from any underlying products in which it is used. To analyze
technology markets, courts will look at particular intellectual property and its close
substitutes. Finally, innovation markets consist of the research and development di-
rected at particular new or improved goods. Here, authorities are watching to ensure
that existing producers do not strangle potentially competitive technologies in their
infancy.
Understanding the full extent of some of the modern intellectual property
schemes, however, requires an analysis of a different type of market. One must look
at the market for monetization of patents or for monetization of copyrights as their
own markets, in order to properly analyze the impact of certain modern behaviors. 8 1
One cannot possibly understand the impact of behavior by mass aggregators, for ex-
ample, without thinking of the market for patent monetization as a whole.
In particular, in looking for potential anticompetitive effects of patent mone-
tization, one must look on three different levels. First, one must consider ways in
which a patent monetization entity with market power in a particular intellectual
property market may be using, obtaining or maintaining that power in an anticom-
petitive manner. Second, as described above, one must worry about ways in which
patent monetization activities could have anticompetitive effects in the market for
patent monetization itself. In both of these dimensions, it is disconcerting to see
product competitors forming alliances so frequently and so freely in a patent moneti-
179 See Ewing &Feldman, supra note22, at 35-37 (discussing at length the changes nec-
essary for effective antitrust analysis under these circumstances).
180 U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE AND FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 8-11 (1995),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm [hereinafter ANTITRUST LICENSING].
See Ewing & Feldman, supra note 22, at 35-37 (describing at length the necessity for
analyzing monetization markets.)
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zation capacity. Large monetizers and aggregators have the potential to operate as
the "hub" in a "hub-and-spokes" conspiracy, in which a centralizing entity can or-
chestrate agreement among horizontal competitors. There may be shifting alliances
as well, in which some of the spokes use the hub to combine against other spokes. It
is hard to imagine that competitor combinations of this kind, with the opportunities
they provide for collusion, can be good for consumers. This is particularly problem-
atic in markets characterized by intense innovation. Those who are currently in the
market are likely to have a preference for reducing next-generation substitutes and
for bashing those who threaten to develop them.
Finally, one has to worry about behavior in the market for patent monetiza-
tion that could affect the underlying individual Intellectual Property markets, even in
the absence of actual power in any of those individual markets.'8 2 In other words, in
the modem world of patent monetization, one may not need to have power in a par-
ticular IP market to affect prices in that market. It is an odd circumstance, but entirely
possible in this new market.
Consider the following: one no longer needs to have a basket of automobile
patents big enough to constitute market power in the auto market in order to affect
the auto market. Perhaps all one would need is a small number of patents in that
market and a reputation for tough tactics. If one happens to have a large grab bag of
assorted patents, so much the better. After 50 patents, most licensing targets will
cease to examine the patents on their individual merits.
For example, suppose I have a patent related to the banking industry. My
claim that this banking patent actually applies to your automobile production may
be pretty farfetched. If I have enough farfetched claims to cause trouble for you,
however, and I am threatening to throw them at you one after another, and I have a
reputation for playing hardball, that may be enough for you to pay what I ask. It may
also be enough for every other automobile manufacturer to pay what I ask, as well.
Under those circumstances, it is possible that I could affect the market for automo-
biles without having much to speak of in the way of automobile patents. If prices rise
throughout an industry, beyond a reasonable return on investment, this creates a loss
of consumer welfare. In short, this type of rent-seeking behavior, in which patent
holders seek a return above the economic value of their patents, can have an exten-
sive effect on consumer prices and consumer welfare.
182 This discussion in this paragraph and the hypothetical in the following paragraph
were first presented in Robin Feldman, Comments on Notice of Roundtable on Proposed Require-
ments for Recordation of Real-Party-in-Interest Information Throughout Application Pendency and Pa-
tent Term, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE (Jan. 24, 2012),
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/Iaw/comments/rpi-information.jsp.
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Most important, none of these levels of antitrust analysis is possible unless
public or private antitrust actors have the information necessary to identify and trace
anticompetitive behavior. Under current circumstances, intellectual property rights
holders are able to use the magnfied power from their rights to bargain for invisibil-
ity and silence. This problem highlights the final limitation in depending on antitrust
action to cabin the inappropriate use of intellectual property. Antitrust analysis is
concerned with market prices. It is not designed to address concerns over actions in
which intellectual property rights are being used for purposes such as hiding embar-
rassing or illegal conduct, avoiding obligations, or pressuring others into surrender-
ing rights. These are not necessarily market power concerns, and yet the behaviors
still may be damaging to society.
In the same vein, antitrust aims its guns at the big players who can throw
their weight around in a particular market. Problems in modern intellectual property
interactions, however, extend far beyond this group. Tremendous uncertainty, the
costs of resolving that uncertainty, and outsized remedies allow intellectual property
rights holders to magnify the power of their intellectual property. This is a problem
for the proper functioning of the intellectual property system, but not necessarily one
that antitrust law is designed to consider.
3. Market Responses
In addition to the potential doctrines that exist for addressing the inappro-
priate use of intellectual property, there also have been sporadic market attempts to
respond. Some companies have tried to address these problems by pledging to use
their intellectual property responsibly. For example, the popular and influential
company Twitter recently announced that it is amending the agreements it signs
with employees who create inventions for the company. Under the amendment, the
company agrees to use patent rights flowing from those inventions only defensively-
-that is, to protect itself against hostile action-and any offensive use of those patents
will require the inventor's consent. 8 3
Twitter's approach is particularly interesting because it creates a certain level
of binding obligation, beyond a mere pledge. Pledges, of course can be withdrawn
and corporate policies shifted. For example, in 2005, Nokia expressed support for the
value of an open source approach in telecommunications patents and pledged not to
183 See Fred Wilson, The Twitter Patent Hack, AVC (Apr. 18, 2012),
http://www.avc.com/a-v/2012/04/the-twitter-patent-hack.html.
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assert patents against the open source Linux Kemal.184 That policy changed, howev-
er, when the company entered into a partnership with Microsoft and transferred
more than a thousand key patents to a known patent troll.18 5
One could also argue that the emergence of patent mass aggregators demon-
strates a market effort to manage intellectual property patents. After all, these organ-
izations, on one level, give operating companies a way to fend off patent litigation.
Mass aggregators are creating risks and harms of their own, however. When
a patent troll recently sued a mass aggregator alleging antitrust violations,8 it was
hard to decide which side to cheer for, although easy to see that there is little for con-
sumers to cheer about, no matter who wins.
In sum, the market approaches are likely to be no more successful at manag-
ing the problem of inappropriate use of intellectual property than the scattered legal
doctrines already in existence. Although antitrust holds some promise -assuming
that the doctrines can be adjusted and that full information can be secured -none of
the approaches, individually or in combination, can fully address the scope of the
problem.
184 See Legally Binding Commitment Not to Assert Nokia Patents against the Linux Kernel,
Statements, NOKIA,
http://web.archive.org/web/20060213045608/http:/www.nokia.com/iprstatements (last vis-
ited Jan. 8, 2013); Form 20(f), SEC (Dec. 31, 2005),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/924613/000104746906002736/a2167693z20-f.htm;
see also[ NOKIA, OUR INSTITUTIONAL STRATEGY, (Dec. 4, 2009) (available at
http://i.nokia.com/blob/view/-/164864/data/3/-/)(noting that open source approach is key to engag-
ing a broad community -- developers, operators, chipset vendors, OEMs etc. We believe that
the larger the ecosystem, the greater the innovation and thus the richer the user experience).
185 See Press Release, MOSAID, MOSAID Updates Shareholders on Special Commit-
tee Process, Addresses Wi-LAN Mischaracterizations (Sept. 12, 2011),
http://www.mosaid.com/corporate/news-events/releases-2011/110912.php; see also Ben
Dummett, Nokia Sells 2,000 Patents: Mosaid Technologies Will Share Revenue Wrung From Wireless
Know-How, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 2, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904716604576544441441198816.html. For
press commentary critical of the move, see Mosaid v. Red Hat - Before You File a Complaint, Learn
the Law (And the Facts), GROKLAW (Jan. 10, 2012),
http://www.groklaw.net/articlebasic.php?story=2012010910240033(complaining that "the
patent troll [MOSAID Technologies] has now climbed into bed with Microsoft and Nolia to try
and cause more havoc with Android);see also Josh Koshman, Patently False: Critics calling our
deal by Microssoft and Nokia over antitrust alarms, NY POST (Sept. 15, 2011),
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/business/patently-false_E4uHQUJFC5XLDMmKgM7wb8
K; see also Dr. Roy Schestowitz, MOSAID Acquires 2,000 Nokia Wireless Patents, TECHRIGHTS
(Nov. 18, 2011), http://techrights.org/2011/11/18/b-and-n-vs-mosaid/.
186 See Nick McCann, Antitrust Battle Against 'Patent Trolls', COURTHOUSE NEWS
SERVICE (Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.courthousenews.com/2012/03/09/44560.htm.
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V. The Doctrine of Inappropriate Use of Intellectual Property
There are many ways in which one can appropriately bargain with intellec-
tual property and many types of uses that are perfectly reasonable. Granting intellec-
tual property rights without allowing an opportunity for a decent return would be a
self-defeating prospect. Nevertheless, there are certain things one should not be able
to bargain for with intellectual property rights. Whether it is a hit on one's mother-in-
law or a missile attack on a competitor's main customer, it is perfectly obvious that
some things are beyond the pale.
I would suggest that society should draw the line far short of criminal activi-
ty. Using intellectual property rights for behavior such as silencing public criticism,
hiding embarrassing or illegal conduct, avoiding obligations, pressuring others into
surrendering rights, harassing competitors, and engaging in anticompetitive schemes
should also be outside the bounds.
The Supreme Court itself has recently suggested that the economic rights
embodied in intellectual property are limited, implying that intellectual property
rights holders are not necessarily entitled to any economic bargain they can strike.
Although the decision was in the context of the doctrine of exhaustion, the Court
pointedly noted the following: "the Constitution's language nowhere suggests that
its limited exclusive right should include a right to divide markets or a concomitant
right to charge different purchasers different prices for the same book, say to increase
or to maximize gain."' 87 This decision follows a series of cases in recent years in
which the Supreme Court has steadily narrowed intellectual property rights. 188
In proposing a doctrine of inappropriate use of intellectual property, I am
not suggesting that such behavior should result in a cancellation of intellectual prop-
erty rights. The draconian nature of patent misuse, in which one's patent rights be-
come entirely unenforceable, may have contributed to the reluctance of courts to ac-
tually use the doctrine. A more flexible and nuanced approach is required, so that
courts can respond with the same level of sophistication as those who would engage
in intellectual property wrongs.
1 See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1371 (2013).
I. See, e.g., Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 106 U.S.P.Q.2d
1972 (U.S. 2013); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012);
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010); Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc. 553 U.S. 617
(2008); KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,
549 U.S. 118 (2007); eBay Inc. v. Merc Exchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006); Ill. Tool Works Inc. v.
Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006); Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193
(2005); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
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A. The Contours of the Doctrine
To some extent, one could analogize the approach to a combination of un-
clean hands and in pari delicto. (Although various courts and commentators mistak-
enly equate the two, they are distinguishable.) 8 9 The doctrine of unclean hands tradi-
tionally springs from the notion that the court will not sully its robes by becoming
involved in the dispute. Thus, under the doctrine of unclean hands, a court will re-
fuse to hear a party's request for equity, if the target of the lawsuit can establish that
the party who sued has, itself, behaved inequitably.'90 Using unclean hands as an
anology, judges in some circumstances of inappropriate use of intellectual property
could follow the example of Judge Posner and reject the lawsuit altogether,'9' on the
grounds that the court need not become an additional tool in the parties' arsenal.
In other circumstances, however, the court may wish to respond in a manner
that would require actually hearing the case. For example, in circumstances in which
intellectual property rights are being used to avoid obligations or force another party
to remain silent, the court might wish to respond by taking the case and nullifying
the silence provision or requiring the intellectual property holder to satisfy the obli-
gation it has sought to avoid. This type of approach would more closely resemble the
doctrine of in pari delicto, in which the court may consider the improper behavior of
the parties when crafting a remedy.
Such an approach would also avoid the necessity of trying to determine a
primary or dominant objective when a party's behavior appears to have multiple mo-
tivations. Where the behavior has both a legitimate aim and the happy coincidence of
allowing a party to avoid its obligations, for example, a court may choose to leave the
appropriate results of the behavior and simply require continued satisfaction of obli-
gations.
The challenge, of course, will be defining the category of inappropriate be-
havior in a manner that is sufficiently robust that the doctrine does not become es-
sentially another weapon in the arsenal that parties launch against each other. I have
no illusions that this will be an easy process. Nevertheless, one should begin with a
simple acknowledgement that a doctrine of inappropriate use of intellectual property
should be developed. That, in itself, would be a significant and useful development,
For an enlightening and extensive explanation of the difference between the doc-
trine of unclean hands, the doctrine of in pari delicto and the failure of courts to appreciate the
difference, see DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAWS OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUriY-REsTrrUTION,Vol.
3, 573-78 West, 2d ed. 1993).
See id.
See supra text accompanying notes 16 - 17.
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signaling to intellectual property rights holders that their behavior will be more
closely scrutinized than in the past.
From that point, one could begin by identifying behavior that is perfectly
appropriate. For example, two competitors who ask the courts to resolve the bounda-
ries of where each of their rights lie, ideally are engaging in a perfectly reasonable
use of the court's time. At the other extreme resides behavior that is clearly inappro-
priate. This category includes a number of the behaviors described here, such as
providing the means for a third party to attack a competitor's customers in order to
raise the cost of a competing product, using intellectual property to buy silence, or
transferring rights to avoid obligations.
The process of defining the boundaries of appropriate intellectual property
behavior will have to be as flexible, dynamic and creative as the parties it governs. In
this process, various doctrines from other areas of law can provide useful analogies.
For example, the general structure of antitrust inquiry, in which certain behaviors are
problematic per se and all others receive a more in depth analysis, would provide a
useful model. The doctrine of inappropriate use of intellectual property could follow
in a similar vein, with some of the behaviors described in this article establishing the
initial per se categories.
As the boundaries of inappropriate behavior are defined, the doctrine of in-
appropriate use could give judges the flexibility to craft remedies tailored to the
wrong that has been inflicted. Consider behavior in which intellectual property
rights holders have used their rights to require nondisclosure requirements that
reach more broadly than confidential information. In those circumstances, a court
could simply invalidate the gag. The inquiry required would be no more onerous
that what courts undertake in numerous circumstances. Judges are frequently called
upon to decide what information must be kept confidential and away from the pub-
lic's eye in lawsuits, particularly where parties claim that the information would re-
veal trade secrets or other competitive information. The same type of inquiry could
determine whether the contours of an intellectual property demand for nondisclo-
sure constitutes an inappropriate use of intellectual property.
Similarly, in cases in which parties have transferred their intellectual proper-
ty rights to third parties to insulate themselves from counterclaims or liability, the
court could choose to ignore the structure of the scheme created. This would be
somewhat analogous to the step transaction doctrine in tax law, in which the IRS will
collapse the steps of a transaction when it is structured to include inappropriate steps
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that allow the taxpayer to evade its tax obligations.192 One could also analogize the
approach to the corporate law doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, when owners
of a corporate entity are held directly responsible for the actions of the corporation.193
In a similar vein, the court could choose to make the original intellectual property
rights holder remain subject to counterclaims or responsible for damages, for exam-
ple, closing the distance that the intellectual property rights holder has tried to create
for itself. Moreover, if intellectual property rights holders are able to shed their obli-
gations to standards bodies through creative transfers, a court could restore those ob-
ligations.
As the Supreme Court noted in the Medimmune case, one should not have to
wait so long in the process as to risk one's business in order to be able to challenge
the behavior.' 94 With this admonition in mind, the doctrine of inappropriate use of
intellectual property should be an affirmative doctrine as well as a defensive one. In
other words, a party should be able to bring an action for inappropriate use against
an intellectual property rights holder, rather than having to wait to be sued for in-
fringement in order to raise it as a defense.' By allowing an affirmative claim, be-
havior that occurs well before any lawsuit has been initiated would more likely be
subject to scrutiny.
192 The Step Transaction Doctrine provides that steps may be collapsed together if it is
determined that the steps are part of an overall plan by the taxpayer. The doctrine ensures that
a taxpayer may not avoid the consequences of related steps by separating them into smaller
steps or a more circuitous route. WEST'S LEGAL FORMS, BUSINESS ORGs. DIv. VII § 59.31 (3d ed.
2012); see also DOBBS, supra note 189, at 567 (discussing cases in which a court refused to grant
restitution to a party who made a transfers to avoid creditors and was then defrauded by the
person to whom the property had been transferred when the person refused to transfer it
back). 19 The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is an exception to the rule that protects
shareholders from liability for the debts of the corporation in which they hold shares. The fol-
lowing provides an excellent summary of the doctrine of piercing the coroporate veil:
This exception, known as the "piercing the veil" doctrine, has long been a
rule, equitable in nature, applied by American courts to fasten liability on
shareholders of corporations of varying size and character for corporate
debts of all kinds. The "veil" of the "corporate fiction," or the "artificial
personality" of the corporation, is "pierced," and the individual or corpo-
rate shareholder exposed to personal or corporate liability, as the case may
be, when a court determines that the debt in question is not really a debt of
the corporation, but ought, in fairness, to be viewed as a debt of the individual
or corporate shareholder or shareholders.
Stephen B. Presser, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL § 1:1 (2013).
194 See Medimmune Inc. v. Genentech Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007) (holding that a licensee
does not have to stop paying royalties and repudiate the license, subjecting itself to liability for
damages, in order to challenge a patent's validity).
9 In contrast, as described above, patent misuse is a defensive doctrine only which
can form the basis of an affirmative lawsuit, outside the confines of a declaratory judgment
suit. See supra text accompanying notes 156 - 157.
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Although the remedial measures above concern responses other than dam-
ages, a fully robust doctrine should include a damage remedy. Where the inappro-
priate actions of an intellectual property rights holder causes damage to an individu-
al or an entity, damages should be available. Thus, for example, when intellectual
property rights holders engage in litigation schemes that weaken an entity's share
price before an IPO or a merger, they could be asked to pay for damages inflicted, as
well as enjoined from engaging in the schemes.
B. Courts or Legislatures?
The flexibility required for responding appropriately to inappropriate uses of
intellectual property suggests that the courts or regulatory bodies would constitute
more effective vehicles than legislatures. If nothing less, the 2011 patent reform legis-
lation -which took many years to develop, resulted in a collection of tinkering altera-
tions, and satisfied very few people -should provide a cautionary tale.
Certain pieces, nevertheless, could require legislative action. For example, if
the Fourth Circuit prevails and the Supreme Court confirms that courts lack the
power to bar claims that fall within a statutorily directed time frame, for example,
legislation may be necessary to accomplish some of the aims outlined above. Even
with such a limitation, however, much could and should be accomplished without
the need for major legislative action.
In the realm of major legislative action, a number of legislative proposals
have been suggested or introduced in recent months. Important aspects of these pro-
posals include instituting sunshine rules to show who owns patents and where the
money is flowing; expanding opportunities for review of broad and questionable pa-
tents; protecting end-users; tightening the standards for granting new patents; and
altering the rules that allow patent trolls to engage in "hide-and-seek" demands -in
which trolls can impose costs on product companies without having to explain the
basis for what they are claiming. In the short term, Congress and the Patent &
Trademark Office can and should take immediate steps such as these to stem some of
the most obvious abuses. Solving the problem, not just nibbling around the edges,
will take both long-term and short-term action, including establishing a system that
can sufficiently address the shifting landscape. Thus, I am not suggesting that the
doctrine of inappropriate use of intellectual property should be the exclusive ap-
proach to solving problems in the realm of intellectual property magnification and
monetization. Nevertheless, a nimble and flexible equitable doctrine would be an
important part of any comprehensive approach.
In addition to the short-term actions that can be undertaken, crafting long-
term and comprehensive solutions, as well as exploring the contours of a proper doc-
trine of inappropriate use of intellectual property, will require a great amount of in-
Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance
formation. How do we know what will be effective for fixing the problems when so
much of the behavior is hidden? We cannot solve what we cannot see. The following
section describes the problem and how to address it.
VI. The Shape of the Iceberg
Mounting anecdotal evidence points to the looming problems all companies
are facing as a result of the shift to intellectual property monetization, the dangers of
magnification, and the troubling behaviors emerging as new markets develop. Relia-
ble empirical data, however, is difficult to come by. Some evidence is available relat-
ed to the rapid rise in the percentage of patent litigation filed by patent monetization
entities. For example, a recent study showed that the percentage of patent infringe-
ment lawsuits filed by patent monetization entities has risen from 22% to almost 40%
over the five years from 2007-2011.196 Other studies have examined different aspects
of monetization behavior in patent litigation as a whole or in specific industry seg-
ments. 97
Anecdotal evidence suggests, however, that litigation is only the tip of the
iceberg.'98 Much of the patent assertion activity seems to occur without litigation, and
a company may receive hundreds of demand letters with only a few resulting in liti-
gation. This, of course, considers only the monetization activity in patents, rather than
all areas of intellectual property.
At a recent FTC/DOJ workshop on the antitrust implications of patent asser-
tion activity, casual conversation concerned the shape of the iceberg that lies below.
Even as we are beginning to understand a little about the tip of the activity repre-
sented by the lawsuits filed, what does the rest of the activity look like? Is it similar to
the tiny part that is visible, or is it entirely different in size and quality?
Careful empirical analysis of the question is almost impossible. Monetization
behavior is buried in complex layers of subsidiaries and revenue sharing arrange-
ments. It is also shrouded in strict non-disclosure agreements, so that even those who
wish to share their experiences with regulators (or academics) are constrained. Even
when the activity proceeds to trial, courts are frequently willing to seal all or part of
the documents. Most important, the reporting requirements built so carefully by
competition authorities and securities regulators are not designed to capture the
196 See Sara Jeruss, Robin Feldman, & Joshua Walker, The America Invents Act 500: Ef-
fects of Patent Monetization Entities on US Litigation, 11 DuKE L. & TECH. REv. 357, 361 (2012).
197 Id.; see also Sara Jeruss, Robin Feldman, & Joshua Walker, The America Invents Act
500 Expanded: Effects of Patent Monetization Entities, UCLA J.L. & TECH (forthcoming 2013).
See Jeruss et al., supra note 196, at 362.
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emerging monetization behavior, or perhaps the monetization behavior is designed
to avoid such reporting.
Additional information is critical for properly shaping the contours of any
and all responses to the problem. The power to obtain that information lies in one
place: with the Federal Trade Commission under the broad investigatory power of
Section 6(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
A. Section 6(b) of Federal Trade Commission Act
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) possesses both targeted law enforce-
ment authority and broad investigatory authority.199 In the realm of investigation, the
FTC has the power to conduct wide-ranging economic studies of businesses and
practices that affect commerce, as well as to report on the information, through an-
nual and special reports and through recommendations for legislation.20 0 Of particu-
lar importance to its investigatory powers, § 6(b) of the Federal Trade Commission
Act authorizes the FTC to require entities to generate and produce reports or written
answers to questions outside of the scope of any specific law enforcement opera-
tion.20 ' The power to compel the creation of information, in addition to simply re-
quiring entities to turn over documents that already exist, has been an extraordinari-
ly robust and effective mechanism for understanding complex effects in the
marketplace and for crafting appropriate responses.202
Some FTC economic investigations utilize only publicly available infor-
mation, thus avoiding the powers enunciated in § 6(b). These types of investigations
were first seen in the 1970s and are issued as "working papers", briefing books, and
"issue papers." Although the FTC has occasionally pursued information through
simultaneous subpoenas and § 6(b) orders, 203 the power outlined in § 6(b) is typically
manifested by the issuance of special orders in industry-wide investigations. 204 These
199 See generally OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING, FTC, HISTORY OF SECTION 6 REPORT-
WRITING AT THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1981) [hereinafter HISTORY OF § 61, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/be/econrpt/231984.pdf.
200 15 U.S.C. § 6(a), (f) (1982).
201 15 U.S.C. § 46(b) (West 2006); 1 STEPHANIE W. KANWIT ET AL., FED. TRADE COMM'N §
13:5 (West 2012).
202 Fed. Trade Conm'n v. Invention Submission Corp., 965 F.2d 1086, 1089 (D.C. Cir.
1992).20
203 For example, see Gasoline Pricing Investigation (Response to Petition), 141 FTC
498, 504 206).
KANWIT, supra note 201.
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special orders mandate the production of documents containing answers to ques-
tionnaires that seek specific information that is then compiled by the FTC.205
Many of the FTC reports have influenced new legislation,206 and an early
FTC Task Force commented that, "[o]f all its activities, the Commission's investiga-
tions have probably had the most substantial impact and enduring value."207 In par
ticular, a number of reports from the FTC's early history played a significant role in
enduring legislation. For example, the FTC's Report on the Meatpacking Industry (1919-
1920) led to the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, the Report on the Grain Trade
(1924-1926) had a strong influence on the passage of the Grain Futures Act, and the
Chain Stores Report (1931-1934) was critical to passage of the Robinson-Patman Act of
1936. FTC reports also pointed the way to the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933,
the Stock Exchange Act of 1934, and the Public Utility Holding Company Act of
1935.208
Two examples of more recent reports include an influential study on the
pharmaceutical industry in 1977 and a series of four studies on the alcoholic bever-
age industry ranging from 1999 to 2012. The pharmaceutical industry investigation
began in 1977.209 The resulting report, issued in 1979, examined the structure of the
industry and concluded that trademarked brand names provided monopolistic mar-
ket power and that state drug anti-substitution laws hindered fair competition. 2 0 The
reported findings heavily influenced legislation, and at least one state adopted the
FTC's proposed law almost verbatim. 2 11 Furthermore, the report assisted successful
court challenges to state drug anti-substitution laws and supported an investigation
that led to a Supreme Court decision to overturn limits on disclosing retail drug pric-
es.212
The FTC investigated the alcohol industry in three studies issued from 1999
to 2008.213 The studies were directed at the dual purposes of studying the impact of
205 See Order to File Special Report, FTC (Apr. 2012), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/04/120412alcoholreport.pdf.
206 HISTORY OF § 6, supra note 199, at 7.
207 Id at 2. (citing Boyle, Economic Reports and the Federal Trade Commission: 50 Years'
Experience, 24 FED. BAR J. 489 (1964)) (quoting FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, TASK FORCE REPORT
ON REGULATORY COMMISSION, app. N, at 127 (1949)).
208 Id. at 2-7.2 09 FTC BUREAU OF ECONOMIcs, SALES, PROMOTION AND PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION IN
Two PRESCRIPTION DRUG MARKElS (1977), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/be/econrpt/197702salespromo.pdf.
210 FED. TRADE COMM'N, STAFF REPORT ON DRUG PRODUCT SELECTION (1979).
211 See HISTORY OF § 6, supra note 199, at n. 189.
212 See Virginia State Bd.of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976).
See generally FTC BUREAU OF ECONOMICs, SELF-REGULATION IN THE ALCOHOL
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alcohol advertisement on underage consumers and determining the effectiveness of
voluntary industry guidelines in decreasing underage consumption.214 The recom-
mendations of the reports resulted in agreements among industry groups to adopt
voluntary placement standards for radio, television, print, and Internet advertise-
ments, a system of periodic internal audits of advertisement placements, and a struc-
ture for external review of compliance.2 15 Though underage drinking is still a reality,
the data show that underage drinking has gradually declined since the studies were
initiated.2 16 In 2012, the FTC again utilized its power under § 6 to issue orders to 14
major alcoholic beverage distributors, seeking detailed information on advertisement
and marketing practices. 217 In these and other wide-ranging economic investigations,
the powers enabled by § 6(b) have provided an important tool for helping to develop
legislative approaches, influencing industry practices, and understanding challenges
in the marketplace.
B. Structuring an FTC § 6(b) Investigation into Intellectual Property
Assertion and Monetization
In structuring an FTC § 6(b) investigation into intellectual property moneti-
zation behavior, it will be critical to ensure adequate confidentiality of business in-
formation. It is certainly possible that an FTC investigation could conclude that some
of the information that entities currently classify as that which cannot be disclosed is
the type of information that ought to be publicly catalogued. For example, the Patent
and Trademark Office is currently considering proposed sunshine rules that would
require patent holders to disclose not only who owns a patent but also who are the
real parties in interest. 218 One could imagine additional recommendations along these
lines emerging from an FTC investigation. Nevertheless, a larger number of compa-
INDUSTRY (2008), available at http://ftc.gov/os/2008/06/080626alcoholreport.pdf; see also FTC
BUREAU OF EcoNoMIcs, ALCOHOL MARKETING AND ADVERTISING (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/alcohol08report.pdf.
214See supra note 213.215 Press Release, FTC Office of Public Affairs, FTC Orders Alcoholic Beverage Manu-
facturers to Provide Data for Agency's Fourth Major Study on Alcohol Advertising (April 12,
2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/04/alcoholstudy.shtm.
216 FTC BUREAU OF EcoNoMIcs, SELF-REGULATION IN THE ALCOHOL INDUSTRY 2 (2008)
(accompanying figures demonstrate a gradual decrease in alcohol consumption among minors
from 1999 to 2007).
217 See Fed. Trade Comm'n, Order to File Special Report, FTC Matter No. P104518 (Apr.
2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/04/120412alcoholreport.pdf.
218 See Notice of Roundtable on Proposed Requirements for Recordation of Real-
Party-in-Interest Information Throughout Application Pendency and Patent Term, 77 Fed.
Reg. 70,385 (proposed November 26, 2012).
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nies are more likely to cooperate willingly with an investigation, if the agency can
minimize concerns about leakage of information that businesses currently consider
confidential.
In this context, a potential untapped fountain of information may exist in the
filings of patent cases themselves. Many of the court documents in patent litigations
have been sealed. Although much of the information undoubtedly concerns technical
details related to technologies, other information under seal may document evidence
of monetization activity -information that was collected for the litigation. Once
again, entities are less likely to resist an order to provide such information if the in-
formation will be anonymized or otherwise kept confidential within the walls of the
FTC.
Willing cooperation is not essential for a § 6(b) investigation, and the federal
courts have upheld the FTC's right to compel compliance.2 19 Obviously, however,
willing participants can be more useful than those who resist, not the least of which
because the agency can avoid the trouble of having to secure various court orders to
compel compliance.
Any investigation will also have to walk a delicate line between 1) surveying
a sufficiently wide selection of entities to ensure empirical reliability and 2) locating
and examining behaviors that are troubling with sufficient depth. In order to pursue
both of the goals effectively, the agency could consider initiating a two-part investi-
gation. In one prong of the investigation, the FTC could request information system-
atically, looking at numerous industries and varying firm sizes within those indus-
tries and requesting information from a random sampling of companies within each
industry and size classification.
The shroud of secrecy that surrounds much of the monetization activity
makes it particularly difficult to know where to look, however, and a different prong
of the investigation could be designed specifically to address that problem. Here, the
FTC could take a deeper look at a number of entities and industry segments as case
studies. As part of deciding what to examine for the case studies, the FTC could pro-
vide a mechanism in which entities could confidentially suggest that their own com-
219 See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 651 (1950) (concluding that the
FTC possesses authority under Section 6 to compel the submission of special reports); F.T.C. v.
Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 883 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that the FTC is "specifically authorized
to compel production of evidence from any place in the United States, at any designated place
of hearing") (internal citations omitted); Appeal of FTC Line of Bus. Report Litig., 595 F.2d 685,
703 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that an FTC orders must enforced "if it does not transcend the
agency's investigatory power, the demand is not unduly burdensome or too indefinite, and the
information sought is reasonably relevant," then enforcing the orders at issue).
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pany's experiences could provide a fruitful case study. In other words, a company
could confidentially say to the FTC, "please require that I ignore my non-disclosure
agreements and respond to your in-depth investigation, because my experiences are
ones that you should look at." In this way, one could provide a signal to the FTC
without violating any obligations to third parties.
The list of case studies actually undertaken by the FTC could be drawn from
a combination of those who confidentially volunteered and those whom the FTC
identified on its own. If handled carefully, this approach could shield the identity of
the volunteers and avoid the possibility of market retaliation against them.
Much of the public discussion at the moment concerns the effects of moneti-
zation on the patent system, and it is certainly true that problems appear to be deeper
and more widespread in patent at this point than in other areas of intellectual prop-
erty. As a result, patents would undoubtedly be the major focus of any FTC investi-
gation. Nevertheless, given the fluidity between the different intellectual property
protections systems and the increasing appearance of monetization behavior outside
of patents, it could be beneficial to include some questions that touch on other intel-
lectual property systems, particularly copyright. Looking at the ways in which mone-
tization is being manifested in other systems could allow us to address problems be-
fore they reach the level of disruption we are seeing in the patent system.
A carefully considered § 6(b) investigation could help guide Congress, the
courts and regulatory agencies in defining what is, and what is not, appropriate use
of intellectual property rights. It could also be essential in identifying the behaviors
that are occurring, understanding their impact, and crafting optimally effective re-
sponses in a way that is the least disruptive to commerce.
VII.Conclusion
Innovation is one of our most valuable national resources. Properly con-
structed, the intellectual property system can nurture that innovation, encouraging
the development of the products, services and economic benefits that accompany a
thriving creative and commercial environment. When those intellectual property
rights, created by society in the hopes of ensuring the concomitant benefits to the in-
dustrial and creative arts, are diverted to the service of more noxious pursuits, we
must create the tools that will allow our legal system to respond.
Above all, litigation should not be a competition tool. Allowing this to flour-
ish unchecked directs society's creative resources away from building a better
mousetrap and towards building better legal traps. Developing the notion of inap-
propriate use of intellectual property is a first step in giving society its own suffi-
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ciently sophisticated arsenal to respond to the harmful use of the rights we ourselves
have created.
I have noted in the past that bargaining over the boundaries of patent rights
is inevitable. 220 The reality of this prospect, however, does not relieve us of the bur-
den of controlling the bargaining. Rather, recognition of the bargain aspect of patents
increases society's responsibility for encouraging the productive use of patents and
discouraging the more destructive aspects of the bargaining.
The same is true for all intellectual property rights. Society has created these
rights, removing activities that could be enjoyed by the whole of society and appro-
priating them to the benefit of the few, in the hopes that the creation of these rights
will redound to the benefit of all. It is our responsibility to rein them in.
I am reminded of a story told to medical students to illustrate the workings
of an insane mind. A man emerges from his house each day, picks up his newspaper
and then drops a large bolder onto his foot. Why would he repeat this painful activi-
ty day after day? Because he believes that it is of benefit to him. With intellectual
property rights, we inflict some pain on ourselves in the hopes of bringing about
long-term gain. The size of the boulder, however, is fast approaching the point at
which it changes from short-term pain to pure insanity.
220 See FELDMAN, supra note 19.
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